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THE IRRELEVANCE OF POLITICS FOR 
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW 
MARK SEIDENFELD

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article contends that, properly understood, judicial review of 
agency action under the reasoned decision-making standard precludes a 
court from considering political influence, but nonetheless allows an 
agency to consider it. It does so by identifying two fundamental attributes 
of such review, as courts have traditionally applied it, that have eluded 
scholarly focus and perhaps recognition altogether. The first attribute is 
that agency reasons, which are what courts review, are justifications 
rather than motivations for agency action. From this attribute, it follows 
that the irrelevance of politics for judicial review does not preclude 
politics as a legitimate agency consideration. The second attribute is that 
reasoned decision-making requires an agency to make manifest the trade-
offs generated by its action. This attribute facilitates political 
accountability by reducing barriers to public awareness of these trade-
offs. This Article argues that permitting an agency to credit politics as a 
justification for a rule would interfere with political accountability by 
relieving the agency of its obligation to reveal the full implications of its 
rulemaking. Thus, this Article promises to profoundly affect conceptions of 
the reasoned decision-making standard of review in general and how 
politics fits within it. 
INTRODUCTION 
What role should political influence—that is agency consideration of 
its belief about the preferences of the president or Congress—play in 
judicial review of agency action?
1
 Over the past two decades, several 
scholars have explicitly called for courts to consider legitimate political 
influence on agency decision-making as a basis for affirming agency rules 
 
 
  Patricia A. Dore Professor of Administrative Law, The Florida State University College of 
Law. Thanks to Lisa Bressman, Curtis Bridgeman, Seth Davis, Linda Jellum, Ron Levin, Emily 
Meazell, Jerry Mashaw, Jonathan Nash, Glen Staszewski, Peter Strauss, and Fernando Téson for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks also to Hastings Read and Elizabeth Dehaan 
for exceptional research assistance. 
 1. I use the term ―political influence‖ and ―consideration of politics‖ interchangeably to mean 
agency consideration of such preferences.  
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under arbitrary and capricious review.
2
 In 1990, Christopher Edley raised 
the subject in his book on judicial control of bureaucracy.
3
 Edley criticized 
the distinction between politics, science, and fairness in agency decision-
making and suggested that, at least at the margins, the inability to draw 
lines between these influences on agency action counsels that courts 
should acknowledge and condone political influence when subjecting such 
action to hard-look review.
4
 In 2001, Elena Kagan suggested that the 
president had asserted significant control over rules promulgated by 
agencies, and that such control imbues rules with legitimacy because of 
the political accountability of the president.
5
 Kagan also suggested that 
this increased accountability warrants courts crediting political influence 
when they engage in review of rules.
6
 Most recently, Kathryn Watts has 
renewed the suggestion that courts allow agencies to invoke political 
influence to bolster their justification of rules upon hard-look review.
7
  
In calling for consideration of politics in judicial review, these scholars 
all rely on a perception that hard-look review is antagonistic to agency 
consideration of politics. As Edley phrased it, ―[t]he dominant theme of 
case law . . . is clearly that hard-look review provides a means of cabining 
 
 
 2. When the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was enacted, its arbitrary and capricious 
basis for reversing an agency action was highly deferential, but courts have developed that review into 
the reasoned decision-making standard or hard-look review, which is much less forgiving of agency 
decision-making. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 
525 (1985) (describing the emergence of hard-look review); See also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing 
Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 668–69 n.99, 671 (1985) 
(explaining that courts now require reasoned decision-making instead of the originally deferential 
interpretation of arbitrary and capricious review). In this Article, I use the terms ―arbitrary and 
capricious,‖ ―reasoned decision-making,‖ and ―hard-look‖ interchangeably.  
 3. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY 72, 187–89 (1990). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–39 (2001). 
 6. Id. at 2380–81. 
 7. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 
YALE L.J. 2 (2009). In addition, Nina Mendelson has written on how administrative law should be 
structured to make presidential influence on agency rulemaking sufficiently transparent to justify 
allowing agencies to rely on such influence. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing ―Political‖ 
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010) [hereinafter Mendelson, 
―Political‖ Oversight]. Mendelson takes a guarded approach to the question Watts poses about 
whether agencies should be able to rely on ―political reasons‖ to justify rules. See id. at 1172–74 
(suggesting that courts should be especially deferential to presidential preferences that reflect value 
choices but not to presidential influence that biases an agency‘s consideration of technical or legal 
criteria). To the extent that Mendelson‘s proposal would either increase deference to agency 
rulemaking when presidential influence has been properly disclosed or would have courts review the 
propriety of political influences on agency rulemaking, this Article lays out why I disagree. See id. at 
1172–75. To the extent that she advocates only mandatory disclosure of White House communications 
that relate to rulemaking procedures, this article does not directly address her proposal. See id. at 
1163–66. 
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political discretion and permitting judges, if so disposed, to impose 
arbitrarily stringent standards of comprehensive rationality.‖8 Some recent 
Supreme Court opinions have reinforced this perception by seemingly 
rejecting political influence as a legitimate basis for agency action. For 
example, the majority in Massachusetts v. EPA rejected President Bush‘s 
political agenda as sufficient to justify the EPA‘s refusal to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions.
9
 Similarly, Justice Breyer‘s dissent in Fox 
Television suggested that the election of a new president is not an 
appropriate basis for the FCC to change its policy about what constitutes 
indecent broadcasting.
10
 But dicta in Justice Scalia‘s plurality opinion in 
Fox Television, which rejected Breyer‘s position,11 cuts the other way. 
Thus, the question of the role of politics as a justification for agency action 
has incited the particular interest of at least three current Supreme Court 
justices as well as several well regarded academics.
12
 What makes this 
Article significant is that it argues that those on both sides in the debate 
have misinformed understandings of the foundation and role of hard-look 
review—understandings that greatly limit the potential benefits such 
review might impart. Hence, this Article has the potential to reshape the 
 
 
 8. EDLEY, supra note 3, at 193; see also Watts, supra note 7, at 12–13 (stating that ―hard look 
review had failed to reflect‖ the ―shift from an expert-based model of agency decisionmaking to a 
politically-based model‖); Kagan, supra note 5, at 2380 (The hard look doctrine ―reflects an ideal 
vision of the administrative sphere as driven by experts . . . . A revised doctrine would acknowledge 
. . . an alternative vision centered on . . . accountability provided by the President.‖). 
 9. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–34 (2007). Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule 
have read the majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA to signal that agency action must be justified 
by science and not political influences—a position which they support. Jody Freeman & Adrian 
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52–54, 66–67 
(2007). 
 10. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 
Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 
561 n.35 (2011) [hereinafter Levin, Hard Look Review] (reading Breyer‘s opinion to ―suggest[] that, 
because of the FCC‘s status as an independent agency, it should be relatively apolitical‖). Some of 
Justice Breyer‘s academic writing might also be read to support the rejection of politics as a relevant 
consideration in agency decision-making. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS 
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 55–56 (1993) (―A depoliticized regulatory process 
might produce better results, hence increased confidence, leading to more favorable public and 
Congressional reactions.‖). 
 11. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 523–25. 
 12. Others who have weighed in on this issue include: Levin, Hard Look Review, supra note 10, 
at 561–62 (endorsing Watts‘s suggestion that a reformulated judicial review doctrine should give 
agencies enhanced opportunities to pursue political priorities); Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, 
Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 875–77 (2012) [hereinafter 
Staszewski, Deliberative Democracy] (criticizing Watts‘ proposal from a deliberative democracy 
perspective); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency 
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 497–98 (1990) 
(opining that agencies must be free to consider the policy preferences of Congress and the President 
when adopting rules).  
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meaning and operation of hard-look review and, more particularly, to 
influence the Supreme Court‘s perception of the propriety of courts 
considering political influence in applying such review.  
Watts has helped clarify precisely what is at issue in this debate. Of the 
works calling for judicial consideration of political influence within the 
hard-look paradigm, Watts‘s article provides the most focused and 
pragmatic exposition of the case for factoring politics into judicial review. 
Unlike prior advocates of this position, Watts suggests operational criteria 
for when and how judges should factor politics into review—that is, the 
precise nature of the kind of influence the courts should credit and the 
situations in which they should credit such influence.
13
 In addition, she 
identifies precise salutary effects that she believes such a change in hard-
look review would have on agency rule-making.
14
 Thus, Watts‘s article 
provides a particularly meaningful foil against which to lay out my 
understanding of judicial review and the likely impact that allowing courts 
to consider politics would have on agency rulemaking.  
For that reason, it was convenient to style this Article as a response to 
Watts‘s article. But, as I hope the Article makes clear, it is actually a 
broader exposition about the role of politics in agency decision-making 
and, more particularly, the proper place of political influence as a factor in 
hard-look review of rulemaking.
15
 In the broadest sense, this Article 
argues that those who have addressed the role of politics have confounded 
the question of the legitimacy of politics in rulemaking with that of the 
legitimacy of judicial consideration of politics in reviewing rulemaking. 
As I explain in Part I, Watts and her fellow critics of hard-look review are 
correct that courts have not credited citations to political influence in 
evaluating whether agency rulemaking meets the hard-look standard. But, 
contrary to the inference Watts draws, this does not reflect any hostility 
within the standard to such influence. In fact, the understanding of the 
administrative state that prompted courts to develop hard-look review 
accepts that agency decisions are political and properly so. In my view, 
however, the hard-look doctrine is a mechanism to ensure that agencies do 
not hide value judgments behind simple incantations that their actions are 
justified by political influence. Therefore, although politics may be a 
 
 
 13. Watts, supra note 7, at 65–73. 
 14. Id. at 33–45. 
 15. Hard-look review applies to all reviewable agency action, not just rulemaking. As Watts 
notes, political influence of agency action is especially defensible for rulemaking. Id. at 65–73. In 
cases involving agency adjudication, agency reliance on political considerations is arguably more 
problematic. See id. at 8 n.14. Hence, like Watts, I focus my arguments on judicial review of rule-
making and related agency actions, such as denials of petitions to institute rule-making.  
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legitimate motivation for agency regulation, it should be irrelevant to 
judicial review of that regulation. 
In Part II of this Article, I show how Watts‘s characterization of hard-
look review‘s attitude toward politically motivated decisions leads her to 
conclude that judicial crediting of political explanations for agency rules 
results in outcomes superior to those under the current reasoned decision-
making standard. It then explains why I believe this conclusion is 
erroneous. I continue in Part III of this Article to consider whether, given 
the insulation of courts from political accountability and their limited 
institutional capacity to evaluate political outcomes, it is appropriate to 
rely on them to distinguish legitimate from improper political influence.  
I. UNDERSTANDING REASONED DECISION-MAKING REVIEW 
A. Watts’s Understanding of the Reasoned Decision-Making Requirement 
According to Professor Watts, the current application of arbitrary and 
capricious review is problematic because courts do not consider agency 
appeals to political influence as legitimate reasons for regulation.
16
 She 
contends that review premised on this rejection of politics is at odds with 
the presidential control model that currently is in vogue in administrative 
law.
17
 That model posits that presidential control of agencies is justified by 
electoral accountability.
18
 Therefore, agency rules should reflect influence 
by the president on purely political grounds, at least where the president 
 
 
 16. Watts, supra note 7, at 32. 
 17. Id. at 39. Although most administrative scholars agree that presidential control is currently 
the predominant justification for the administrative state, many have expressed doubts about its 
theoretical basis and wisdom. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness 
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 492–515 (2003) [hereinafter 
Bressman, Beyond Accountability]; Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple 
Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 988 (1997); Staszewski, Deliberative 
Democracy, supra note 12, at 875; Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 64 (2008); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or ―The Decider‖? The 
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702–03 (2007); see also infra note 19 
and accompanying text. Nor am I aware of any court that has squarely relied on the presidential 
control model to justify a doctrine of administrative law. See generally Jodi L. Short, The Political 
Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811 (2012) 
(discussing at length the history leading to scholars‘ calls for political influence to justify agency 
action, but reporting no case in which a court relies on the presidential control model).  
 18. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. 
REV. 23, 35 (1995) (arguing that presidential control is superior to congressional control because the 
president is accountable to the entire electorate); Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and 
Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1352 (2011) (noting that ―recent scholarship has 
focused on the potential of presidential control to ensure that agencies exercise their discretion in a 
way that is democratically accountable‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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publicly grounds his support for these rules in ―public values,‖ and where 
doing so does not lead the agency to act inconsistently with its authorizing 
statute.
19
 For Watts, like Edley and Kagan, the fact that such political 
influence of rulemaking is proper translates into her belief that agencies 
should be able to use that influence to bolster decisions that courts 
otherwise might find insufficiently reasoned.
20
  
Watts supports this belief by suggesting that the reasoned decision-
making standard that courts currently apply, while grounded in the 
―interest group model‖ of the administrative state, reflects vestiges of the 
―expertise model,‖ which was used to justify the New Deal but has been 
criticized and not generally accepted since the adoption of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) just after World War II.
21
 She goes 
on to note that increasingly the president is dictating agency policy.
22
 The 
president is a political actor, not a technocrat, and his preferences reflect 
politics, not technocratic expertise. In some cases, Congress, along with or 
instead of the president, exerts great influence on agency rulemaking.
23
 
Therefore, Watts contends that it is best for the agency to report the actual 
motivation for its decision, which in many instances is that the change was 
requested by the president or adopted in response to congressional 
pressure.
24
 Because the president and Congress are elected, they will be 
held politically accountable for the agency‘s regulatory choices when an 
 
 
 19. See Kagan, supra note 5, at 2380–83; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why 
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 94–95 (1985). 
 20. Watts, supra note 7, at 41–43; see also EDLEY, supra note 3, at 187–92 (generally implying 
that the reality of political influence on agency rulemaking translates into the propriety of judicial 
consideration of such influence); Kagan, supra note 5, at 2380–83 (proposing that courts read statutes 
to authorize the president to dictate rules for executive agencies and that courts show deference to such 
dictated rules). Thus, this Article is a rebuttal of Edley‘s and Kagan‘s work as well as that of Watts. 
 21. Watts, supra note 7, at 33–34; see also JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 58–62 (1978) (noting the New Deal‘s 
emphasis on political independence to ensure agency pursuit of the public interest); MARTIN SHAPIRO, 
WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS?: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 60–63 (1988) (describing 
the New Deal conception of expert agencies and its fall from favor).  
 22. Watts, supra note 7, at 35–36. 
 23. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 64–65 
(2006) (noting that Congress, as well as the president, is involved in ―day to day administration of the 
law‖). See generally Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and 
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 
VA. L. REV. 431 (1989) (explaining how administrative procedures allow Congress to influence 
agency policy). 
 24. Watts, supra note 7, at 32–33, 35–37, 78; see also Kagan, supra note 5, at 2272–303 
(describing the mechanisms used by Presidents Reagan through Clinton to control administrative 
action); Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? 
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 768–70 (1983) 
(describing how changes in the makeup of Congress affected FTC policy). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/3
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agency relies on public expressions of a desired regulatory outcome by the 
president or Congress.
25
 Hence, judicial review should reflect the reality 
that drives agency decisions.
26
 She contends that arbitrary and capricious 
review should be made more like review of agency statutory interpretation 
under Chevron, which she claims reflects the political control model of the 
administrative state.
27
 Although Watts tries to suggest otherwise, in doing 
so she essentially advocates for permitting agencies to substitute political 
influence for some of the analysis that courts would otherwise require 
under hard-look review.
28
 
 
 
 25. See Watts, supra note 7, at 35–37 (describing scholars‘ acceptance of the political control 
model as providing democratic accountability). 
 26. See id. at 33–39. Those, like Watts, who advocate judicial consideration of the president‘s 
influence on rulemaking may overstate the extent to which politics actually dictates agency action. For 
example, Kagan intimates that FDA regulation of cigarettes was adopted at the behest of President 
Clinton. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2282–83. According to the account by David Kessler—the head of the 
FDA who promulgated the regulation—President Clinton signed off on an already ongoing FDA effort 
to regulate tobacco, which he then made a salient part of his public regulatory agenda. DAVID 
KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 328–32 
(2001).  
 27. Watts, supra note 7, at 37–38, 77–78, 84. One can read isolated excerpts of Chevron to 
support that it reflects the presidential control model. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (―While agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government 
to make such policy choices . . .‖). This reading, however, is undermined by the fact that Chevron 
seems to permit reasoned decision-making review at step two. See id. at 844 (holding that where the 
relevant statutory provision is ambiguous, ―a court may not substitute its own construction of a 
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency[,]‖ unless 
the interpretation is ―arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute‖); Massachusetts v. 
Sebelius, 638 F.3d 24, 33–36 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying hard-look review at step two); see also 
Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating that the analysis under step two of Chevron 
is the same ―in substance‖ as that under arbitrary and capricious review); Kenneth A. Bamberger & 
Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 625 (2009); Gary S. Lawson, 
Commentary, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1377, 1378 (1997); For additional discussion of cases applying the reasoned decision-
making standard at step two, see Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1265 n.53, 1267 (1997). Finally, given that the Court had just decided 
State Farm the prior year and that the Chevron opinion gives no indication that the Court understood 
that it was making major changes in administrative law, it seems unlikely that Chevron was meant to 
endorse political control of agency rulemaking. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The 
Making of an Accidental Landmark, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 398, 420 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 
2006) (concluding that the Court saw Chevron as a routine case and that its opinion merely restated 
established doctrine); see also Jamison E. Colburn, Waters of the United States: Theory Practice and 
Integrity at the Supreme Court, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 183, 207 n.122 (2007) (arguing that the 
accountability of the president was one of three rationales on which Chevron based its demand for 
deference, and that this rationale is inconsistent with the other two). 
 28. Hard-look review essentially requires an evaluation of the agency‘s explanation of the 
reasoning supporting its decision. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of ―Hard 
Look‖ Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 758–59 (2006) [hereinafter Stephenson, ―Hard Look‖ 
Judicial Review]. Thus, although Watts asserts that she is not advocating that politics substitutes for 
agency analysis, the fact that her proposal would require a court to affirm an agency action 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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B. My Understanding of the Reasoned Decision-Making Requirement 
A major problem with Watts‘s critique is that she fails to distinguish 
the legitimate motivations for agency rulemaking from the factors that 
courts may consider when determining whether it is arbitrary and 
capricious. That is, Watts seems to believe that because the hard-look 
doctrine does not consider agency proffers of political influence as 
relevant to judicial review that doctrine rejects the validity of political 
influence.
29
 My understanding is that hard-look review is structured to 
separate agency value judgments, which courts concede can be based on 
politics, from the empirical predicates that underlie any particular rule, 
which should be based on objective analysis. Contrary to Professor 
Watts‘s contention, invocation of political reasons to justify a rule under 
hard-look review is not forbidden; it is simply irrelevant.  
This point is crucial because it highlights Watts‘s (as well as Edley‘s 
and Kagan‘s) characterization of judicial review currently as antagonistic 
to political decision-making. As I explain below, reasoned decision-
making review is not a vestige of the expertise model of the administrative 
state, but rather is premised on the interest group model of the 
 
 
accompanied by proper invocation of political influence without explanation otherwise sufficient to 
pass hard-look review means that politics would substitute for analysis. See infra notes 154–56 and 
accompanying text; see also Enrique Armijo, Politics Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A Response to 
Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 573, 576 (2010) (opining that ―the notion that . . . political 
influence would be used only as a ‗tiebreaker‘ when an agency record would support several proposed 
courses of action . . . is specious‖).  
 29. Although Watts does not assert this directly, her characterization of hard-look review‘s 
intolerance of political influence is most evident in her argument that allowing courts to factor politics 
into judicial review would bring ―[g]reater [c]oherence to [a]dministrative [l]aw‘s [v]acillation 
[b]etween [e]xpertise and [p]olitics.‖ Watts, supra note 7, at 33–39. In that section of her article, she 
concludes that her proposal would ―better harmonize[] [hard-look review] with administrative law‘s 
current embrace of political decision-making.‖ Id. at 39. If one does not read hard-look review as 
antagonistic to political influence of agency decision-making, there is no need for harmonization. 
 The assumption that the factors an agency can use to justify a decision to a court are the same as 
those it may rely on in making its decision unfortunately seems to be widely shared, even by those 
who are uncomfortable with use of politics to justify agency regulation. See, e.g., Staszewski, 
Deliberative Democracy, supra note 12, at 859 (―If the fundamental goal of administrative law is to 
ensure that the policy choices of agencies are subject to the control of the president and ultimately 
reflect his preferences, it would be strange if agencies were precluded by law from expressly justifying 
their policy choices on this very basis.‖); Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 51–52 (concluding 
that Massachusetts v. EPA, which required the EPA to justify its refusal to regulate greenhouse gasses 
on technical grounds, signaled that agencies could not rely on politics in reaching its decision); 
Mendelson, ―Political‖ Oversight, supra note 7, at 1171 (asserting that if agencies disclosed political 
reasons, ―[j]udges . . . would need to take account of those reasons‖); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What 
Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 67 (2009) 
[hereinafter Pierce, What Factors Can an Agency Consider] (asserting that the courts confront the 
issue of the ―factors that an agency must, can, and cannot consider‖ every day).  
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administrative state, which accepts that agency action will and should 
reflect politics.
30
 In fact, this acceptance of politics as part of 
administrative decision-making, together with the judiciary‘s recognition 
that its role is not to engage in weighing of political choices, explains why 
hard-look review must focus on non-political explanations for 
rulemaking.
31
 Essentially, one role of hard-look review is to facilitate 
political accountability by demanding that an agency make manifest the 
trade-offs generated by its rulemaking. The acceptance of agency politics 
by the interest group model, which is the impetus for this role of hard-look 
review, directly implies that such review is relevant to the political control 
model as well. 
Before proceeding to marshal evidence for my reading of hard-look 
review however, I need to clarify the sense in which I mean that such 
review accepts political decision-making. According to my conception of 
hard-look review, politics is an acceptable justification for agency action 
to the extent it invokes the value judgments of those in power about the 
trade-offs inherent in such action.
32
 Hence, the fact that an administration 
holds an ideology that leads it to weigh the costs and benefits of a rule 
differently from a prior administration is a valid basis for changing the 
rule. What is not allowed under hard-look review is invocation of what 
Watts calls raw politics, by which she means an assertion that a rule is 
justified simply because it is preferred by the current group in power or 
their supporters—that is, because it makes the politically winning coalition 
better off regardless of its effects on others.
33
 Such a justification for a rule 
 
 
 30. For a description of these models, see generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975) or Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1518–22 (1992) [hereinafter 
Seidenfeld, Civic Republican]. 
 31. The judiciary‘s recognition of its non-political role is consistent with my reading of Chevron, 
see Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 289–94 (2011) 
[hereinafter Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation], and helps explain the Court‘s issuance of that opinion 
only a year after State Farm adopted the reasoned decision-making standard of review. See Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (describing the 
reasoned decision-making standard of review).  
 32. See Antonin Scalia, Chairman’s Message: Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. xxv, 
xxv–xxvii (1982) [hereinafter Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics] (pre-State Farm remarks asserting that, 
although not reflected in judicial doctrine, courts have allowed agencies to factor ―what the public 
wants‖—as reflected through the political influence of the president, Congress, and interest groups on 
agencies—into its rulemaking decisions); Levin, Hard Look Review, supra note 10, at 562; 
Mendelson, ―Political‖ Oversight, supra note 7, at 1137–38, 1146–57 (stating that presidential 
influence should be seen as appropriate for ―value-laden decisions‖). 
 33. See Watts, supra note 7, at 54–55. The distinction between accounting for values of the 
current administration and not relying on raw politics is subtle but crucial. Perhaps the distinction is 
best summed up as the distinction between the agency doing what it believes to be best based on its 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
150 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:141 
 
 
 
 
violates the requirement that agency action not be arbitrary.
34
 In this sense, 
Watts is correct that hard-look review is dismissive of politics, but only of 
the kind of politics that cannot validly justify agency action.  
As importantly however, hard-look review does not reject a rule 
because it is politically motivated, even if that motivation is a self-serving 
and venal political calculation.
35
 Hard-look review accepts politically 
motivated rules because it concerns itself with justification, not 
motivation. A policy that is motivated by the president‘s desire to provide 
benefits to his political supporters may nonetheless be defensible as good 
policy.
36
 This is implicitly recognized under the principle of administrative 
regularity, which in relevant part holds that courts will not second guess 
whether the reasons an agency gives for its decision are the actual reasons 
that motivated the decision.
37
 As will become clear when I discuss the 
details of hard-look review, I read the cases to say that courts will reject an 
 
 
evaluations of trade-offs versus the agency doing what it knows is not best simply to give those in 
power what they desire. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (holding 
that hard-look review does not require an agency to prove that its policy is best, the agency need only 
show why it believed the policy to be best). 
 34. See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 17, at 474 (reporting that the ―judicial 
innovation‖ of forcing ―agencies to substantiate their decisions with a public rationale to prevent 
deviation for nonpublic purposes‖ was meant to prevent against arbitrary agency action). Prohibition 
of agency reliance on mere preferences of those in power is consistent with a deliberative democratic 
view of administrative agencies, which requires that agency action further the public interest rather 
than simply the interests of those in power because they are in power. See Staszewski, Deliberative 
Democracy, supra note 12, at 857–58, 887–88. One must be careful to recognize however, that desires 
to benefit one subgroup of the citizenry at the expense of others can be in the public interest if there is 
a public regarding justification for providing such benefit. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra 
note 30, at 1532. 
 35. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (suggesting that West 
Virginia Senator Robert Byrd‘s attempt to get the EPA to consider jobs in the Eastern United States 
coal belt was not improper); see also Antonin Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation, 55 
ANTITRUST L.J. 191, 197 (1986) [hereinafter Scalia, Role of the Judiciary] (―When we review the rule, 
all that we judges really say is, ‗Well, if a person was only using these factors set forth in the statute 
and trying to do it analytically, a person could come out with this result. It is within the bounds of the 
acceptable.‘ But, we are not saying that is the real reason they came to that result.‖).  
 36. The confusion of motivation with justification lies at the heart of the genetic fallacy. See 
Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1098 n.89 (1982) (―The fallacy is so named 
because it conflates the genesis of a view with the grounds on which the view is judged to be true or 
false. . . . A common example of the genetic fallacy [occurs when one] . . . . attempt[s] to discredit the 
views of another . . . by showing that she had disreputable motives for holding them.‖). Watts seems to 
succumb to this fallacy to the extent she wants the courts to credit political influence on rulemaking 
when it appears to have motivated the agency to act. See Watts, supra note 7, at 84. But, she is in good 
company as most scholars of judicial review of agencies assume that justifications reflect the actual 
motivation for agency decisions. See supra note 29. 
 37. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm‘n, 789 F.2d 26, 44–45 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Scalia, 
Role of the Judiciary, supra note 35, at 197 (―If somebody tells us that isn't the real reason, then we 
will kick it away.‖). 
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agency value judgment underlying a decision only in the extremely rare 
instance when those judgments are so implausible that no one could 
reasonably conclude that the trade-offs inherent in the adoption of a rule 
are socially beneficial. Thus, hard-look review does not second guess 
legitimate policy decisions by agencies that are motivated by raw politics, 
but does prohibit decisions that cannot be justified by anything other than 
raw politics. 
1. The Expertise Model and Judicial Review 
The expertise model of the administrative state was developed to 
enable the progressive agenda and ultimately the New Deal to escape both 
political influence,
38
 which often reflected the power of those who 
controlled business, and judicial interference,
39
 which had stymied the 
progressive agenda by finding that agenda inconsistent with economic 
rights of property and contract.
40
 The expertise model attempted to 
eliminate political influence by characterizing the issues that came before 
agencies as non-political.
41
 To do so, the model assumed that seemingly 
value-laden decisions were not controversial if viewed from the 
perspective of the professionals on agency staffs who made these 
decisions.
42
 Essentially, the model viewed agencies as politically 
disinterested entities comprised of professionals whose decisions are 
driven by their professional knowledge and training. The idea was very 
much the way people used to think of doctors in a much simpler and more 
trusting time.
43
 If you were sick, you went to the doctor; he examined you, 
figured out what was wrong, and prescribed the cure.
44
 No one questioned 
whether there was a better treatment, let alone whether the doctor‘s action 
 
 
 38. See FREEDMAN, supra note 21, at 59–60 (reviewing Progressive and New-Deal-era rationales 
for granting agencies independence from the political process). 
 39. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, The Science Obsession, and Judicial Review 
as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 756–57 (2011) (under the expertise model, 
―[j]udicial review was characterized by great deference‖). 
 40. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 
VA. L. REV. 841, 872 (2009) (stating that ―[t]he Supreme Court . . . was perceived as hostile to 
government regulation, invoking constitutional rights of personal liberty and due process to block high 
profile New Deal initiatives‖).  
 41. See Stewart, supra note 30, at 1678. 
 42. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 30, at 1519.  
 43. See Michael Betz & Lenahan O‘Connell, Changing Doctor-Patient Relationships and the 
Rise in Concern for Accountability, 31 SOC. PROBS. 84, 85 (1983) (noting a marked decline in patient 
trust of doctors after the ―golden age of medicine,‖ from 1910 to 1950). 
 44. See L.M.L. Ong et al., Doctor Patient Communication: A Review of the Literature, 40 SOC. 
SCI. MED. 903–05 (1982) (stating that prior to about 1962, the traditional doctor-patient relationship 
was paternalistic: the doctor directed care and made all decisions about treatment). 
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was motivated by some interest he might have outside of the patient‘s 
welfare.
45
 Similarly, political influence in agency decision-making was 
seen as corrupting and biased when brought to bear on what were 
essentially professional questions about what needed to be done to cure the 
relevant ill that the agency was authorized to address.
46
 As a result, 
agencies needed to be insulated from politics.
47
 This insulation was 
achieved by creating multimember boards as agency heads, where no more 
than a bare majority of board members could come from any one party, 
and by creating tenure in the jobs of agency heads and staff, protecting 
them from being fired by the president except for cause.
48
 
The progressive and New Deal movements also saw courts as 
interfering with agencies‘ abilities to cure society‘s ills.49 Courts at the 
time relied on rights, especially those of property and contract, to find 
social regulation beyond the powers of government.
50
 Hence, at the same 
time that Congress was creating the National Labor Relations Board, 
perhaps the quintessential New Deal agency, it was limiting the 
 
 
 45. See Betz & O‘Connell, supra note 43, at 91 (describing the rise of the medical accountability 
world view in which doctors are ―self-interested vendors of medicine and as unworthy of trust as 
merchants‖). 
 46. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 142–43 (1938); Seidenfeld, Civic 
Republican, supra note 30, at 1513 (stating that ―New Dealers . . . asserted that agency decisions were 
applications of technical expertise, best made outside an environment influenced by interest groups 
and the political process‖).  
 47. See LANDIS, supra note 46, at 113–14; Joseph B. Eastman, A Twelve Point Primer on the 
Subject of Administrative Tribunals, in SELECTED PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF JOSEPH B. EASTMAN, 
1942–44, at 375 (G. Lloyd Wilson ed., 1948). For a general description of the influence of the 
expertise model on administrative law, see Stewart, supra note 30, at 1676–81. 
 48. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010) (describing traditional independent agency structure as including ―a 
multimember commission with for-cause removal protection‖); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-
So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 
459, 463 (2008) (stating that independent agencies are characterized by ―long commissioner tenure, 
staggered terms, and political insulation . . . to facilitate a non-political environment where regulatory 
experts can apply their knowledge to complex policy problems‖); see also Marshall J. Breger & Gary 
J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2000) (noting that independent agencies ―are ‗independent‘ of the 
political will exemplified by the executive branch, yet they are also multi-member organizations, a fact 
that tends toward accommodation of diverse or extreme views through the compromise inherent in the 
process of collegial decisionmaking‖). 
 49. See John Dinan, Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38 
RUTGERS L.J. 983, 989 (2007) (noting that ―numerous state court decisions . . . were viewed by 
Progressive reformers as blocking enactment of important policies‖); Pritchard & Thompson, supra 
note 40 (explaining that New Dealers saw the courts as a potential barrier to their experimentation with 
the regulatory state). 
 50. See PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 155–57 
(1998). 
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jurisdiction of courts to entertain suits for labor injunctions
51
 and 
otherwise trying to discourage courts from declaring progressive 
legislation unconstitutional under Lochner-era substantive due process.
52
 
Therefore, the only role for the courts under the expertise model was to 
delineate the outer bounds of agency authority and to check that agency 
regulation did not grossly transgress those bounds.
53
 Drawing on my prior 
analogy to doctors as professionals, the model wanted to make sure that 
the doctors did not decide to sell patients insurance instead of providing 
medical care. Obviously, this standard of review is a far cry from the hard-
look test that Watts criticizes.  
2. Reasoned Decision-Making and the Interest Group Model  
Review for reasoned decision-making, not surprisingly, is best 
explained by the interest group model of the administrative state.
54
 This 
was probably the most prevalently accepted justification for rulemaking in 
the early 1970s, when courts developed the hard-look doctrine.
55
 The 
 
 
 51. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a lynchpin of the New Deal, transferred power 
over labor policy from the courts to an agency because courts were seen as unduly hostile to labor 
interests. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 134–98 (1930); Rebecca 
Hanner White, Time for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the ―Law of the 
Circuit‖ When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 
639, 651–52 (1991).  
 52. New Dealers‘ frustration with the courts even prompted President Franklin Roosevelt to 
propose his oft-noted court-packing plan. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 990–96, 1010 (2000). 
 53. See Stewart, supra note 30, at 1679–81; see also Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 
30, at 1518–19. 
 54. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1039–44, 1059–67 (1997); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional 
Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 (2010). To the extent the doctrine requires that agencies 
provide an opportunity for transformative dialogue and ultimately justify regulations based on 
something other than raw politics, one can argue that it also embodies principles of deliberative 
democracy. See Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty and Applying an Agency 
Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 443–47 (2003) (explaining how notice and 
comment procedures and hard-look review ―encourage and enforce‖ the ideals of deliberative 
democracy); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61–63 
(1985) (explaining how hard-look review facilitates the goals of deliberative democracy). 
 55. The hard-look test was first announced in Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 
841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). It developed over the following decade, influenced perhaps by the 
legislatively demanded inquiry into an agency‘s consideration of environmental impacts of its 
decisions under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying 
Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 493 n.59 (1997) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Demystifying 
Deossification]; see also Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1189, 1298–99 (1986) (explaining how both NEPA and hard-look review developed from an 
expectation that agencies broaden their regulatory perspectives). 
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interest group model was the predominant legal view when the Supreme 
Court signed onto the reasoned decision-making standard in State Farm in 
1983.
56
 
That model views government suspiciously because of its susceptibility 
to being used to provide rents to special interest groups.
57
 According to the 
interest group model, the Madisonian notion of faction counteracting 
faction is complicated by the fact that some factions have advantages over 
others. In the regulatory arena, regulated entities control relevant 
information and thus do not bear the same costs in order to participate in 
the regulatory process.
58
 Those with focused interests, which often also 
correspond to the regulated entities, have the advantage of lower costs of 
organizing and coordinating action.
59
 
On top of all of this, according to the interest group model, agencies 
are prone to capture because they are structured to advantage regulated 
entities.
60
 Agency staff members often share the professional background 
of the employees of the companies they regulate and in many instances 
interact closely with their industry compatriots on a day-to-day basis.
61
 
 
 
 56. The interest group model of administrative law ascended to the predominant judicial view in 
the 1970s and the presidential control model began to replace it only after President Reagan 
implemented stronger executive branch controls over rulemaking in 1982. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1761–66 (2007) [hereinafter 
Bressman, Procedures as Politics]. Legal scholars, however, did not begin to advocate that model as a 
justification for the administrative state at least until Jerry Mashaw‘s article in 1985 advocating 
delegation because of the unique position of the president as answerable to the entire polity. See 
Mashaw, supra note 19, at 95–96.  
 57. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 
101 YALE L.J. 31, 43 (1991) (finding the ―disproportionate influence of well-organized interest groups 
[to be] disturbing‖); Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: 
Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 625–26 
(2010) (describing as pessimistic the view that separation of powers encourages Congress to delegate 
regulatory authority to agencies to enable them to deliver rents to special interest groups).  
 58. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 176–77 (1990) (noting that special 
interest outcomes may result from differential levels of ―information, organization, and transaction and 
monitoring costs‖). 
 59. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOOD AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 29 (1980). 
 60. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 263–64 (1986) (describing the 
theory of regulatory capture); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, 
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (1987).  
 61. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 30, at 1555 (noting that the shared professional 
backgrounds between agencies and those they regulate can result in parochial biases, but that judicial 
review and staff structure can counteract this problem); Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification, supra 
note 55, at 510 (explaining how hard-look review ―encourages agencies to obtain . . . input from 
various professional perspectives. . . . [which] discourages rules that reflect a biased or parochial view 
of the public interest‖). 
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Even when a diffuse interest group is able to secure legislative benefits, or 
at least a compromise with opposing special interest groups within the 
legislative arena, the diffuse group may lose what the statute granted it 
because focused interest groups have greater influence over the statute‘s 
implementation.
62
 Thus, the interest group model of the administrative 
state both cautions against making it too easy for the government to act 
and seeks legal requirements for agency action that will help to equalize 
the playing field in the regulatory arena.  
The doctrinal details of the reasoned decision-making standard respond 
to the cautionary message of the interest group model. The standard is 
essentially process based; it does not demand that outcomes meet any 
particular substantive standard.
63
 To meet the standard, an agency must 
justify any decision to adopt a rule by, among other things, addressing 
factors that are relevant to its decision.
64
 It must reveal the data on which it 
relies as well as the assumptions it makes in analyzing that data.
65
 It must 
show how its factual determinations and predictions follow from the data 
in its decision-making record. In rulemaking, if a commenter introduces 
relevant data or proposes alternatives to the agency‘s action that plausibly 
can better serve the purposes of the enabling act, the agency must consider 
the data and alternatives and explain why they did not lead the agency to a 
different outcome.
66
 This burden of explanation may require the agency to 
 
 
 62. See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1, 40–47 (2008) (explaining how ―agency failures to implement regulatory statutes may be the 
result of asymmetries in the ability of regulatory subjects and regulatory beneficiaries to monitor and 
influence the political process‖); see also R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE 
CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 198–99 (1983) (describing EPA regional offices as giving violators 
―time to receive and install requisite control equipment,‖ allowing ―firms in financial trouble to phase 
in expensive controls,‖ and sometimes even allowing ―a firm to operate a facility‖ in violation of 
permit requirements ―while it [builds] a replacement facility‖).  
 63. See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 56, at 1779; Gary Lawson, Outcome, 
Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 
313, 318–19 (1996) (noting that reasoned decision requirement relates to agency process); Mark 
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 486, 518 (2002) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing] (explaining that ―[t]he 
‗hard-look‘ or ‗relevant factors‘ rubric . . . is almost entirely a process-based evaluation‖). 
 64. See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 
1032, 1053 (2011) (stating that hard-look review ―forces agencies to ensure both that their decisions 
are scientifically and technocratically defensible and that those decisions rest on a plausible legal 
account of which factors are statutorily relevant‖). 
 65. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: ―Agency-Forcing‖ Measures, 58 
DUKE L.J. 2125, 2181 (2009) (noting that hard-look review is meant ―to ensure that agencies disclose 
relevant data and provide reasoned responses to material objections raised during the rulemaking 
process‖). 
 66. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on ―Deossifying‖ the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410 (1992) (explaining that ―a reviewing court [is] obliged . . . to determine whether 
the agency applied the correct analytical methodology, applied the right criteria, considered the 
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flesh out the information introduced into the record by a commenter to 
allow a court to determine whether the information warranted more careful 
consideration of an alternative by the agency. 
As numerous articles have noted, hard-look review increases an 
agency‘s cost of adopting a rule and slows down the agency decision-
making process, sometimes quite markedly.
67
 Whether such an increase in 
costs and delay are good or bad may depend on the precise circumstances 
surrounding the rulemaking.
68
 But, such delay and the increase in 
rulemaking costs can be seen as a substitute for the inertia built into the 
legislative process by bicameralism and presentment, requirements that 
agency rulemaking sidesteps.
69
  
Hard-look review also guards against an agency deviating from its 
statutory charge. Statutes may authorize an agency to act within a 
prescribed set of circumstances; simultaneously, the same statutes 
frequently limit the scope of agency action or demand that the action 
further particular regulatory ends.
70
 Statutes may also require an agency to 
 
 
relevant factors, chose from among the available range of regulatory options, relied upon appropriate 
policies, and pointed to adequate support in the record for material empirical conclusions‖); see also 
Short, supra note 17, at 1819–20 (noting that the rationalist view of hard-look review ―places the onus 
on the agency (1) to document reasons for its decisions; (2) to compile evidence supporting those 
reasons; (3) to consider, analyze, and reject contrary evidence; and (4) to consider, analyze, and reject 
important alternatives to its preferred policy based on the available evidence‖).  
 67. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 224–
54 (1990); McGarity, supra note 66, at 1400–03; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of 
Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of 
the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991); see also Stephenson, ―Hard Look‖ Judicial Review, supra 
note 28, at 766 (arguing that the increase in costs imposed on the agency by hard-look review allows 
the agency to signal which rules it expects will provide the greatest benefits).  
 68. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification 
Critique of Judicial Review, 70 OHIO. ST. L.J. 251 (2009) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act]. 
 69. The ―cumbersome process of bicameralism and presentment serves several related interests: 
It makes it more difficult for ‗factions‘ to capture the legislative process; it restrains passion and 
promotes deliberation . . . and it creates a bias in favor of filtering out bad laws by raising the decision 
costs of passing any law.‖ John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 899 
(2004). Notice and Comment procedures serve these same interests. Id. at 944 (―[L]awmaking 
processes such as bicameralism and presentment or notice-and-comment rulemaking promote caution, 
deliberation, and accountability‖); see also Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive Branch, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 164 (2009) (contending that ―statutes [implemented] pursuant to notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures . . . arguably promote the underlying goals of bicameralism and 
presentment‖). 
 70. For example, the Housing Act of 1937 authorizes local housing agencies to evict tenants in 
federally subsidized public housing if the ―public housing tenant, any member of the tenant‘s 
household, or any guest or other person under the tenant‘s control,‖ engages in ―drug related criminal 
activity on or off [the tenant‘s] premises.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). This statute both authorizes 
evictions and limits the bounds to those provided by the statute. See Dep‘t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. 
Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
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regulate in particular factual circumstances.
71
 Forcing the agency to 
explain the factual predicates for a rule and to tie them to the rulemaking 
record facilitates judicial review to ensure that the rule is consistent with 
the agency‘s statutory mandates or limitations. 
Finally, hard-look review helps put less connected interest groups on 
the same footing in the administrative process as more focused groups like 
the regulated industry. At least a priori, an agency must treat data, 
suggested alternatives, and arguments from all interested persons with 
equal respect.
72
 An agency acts at its own peril if it ignores comments that 
it finds unsophisticated or unpersuasive because it has no way of knowing 
whether the reviewing court will find those comments relevant to the 
agency determination.
73
 Interest groups with less access to information 
about the entity or matter being regulated often can burden the agency to 
generate information simply by raising issues about the agency data or 
preferred outcome. And the agency at least must explain the predicted 
impact of the action it takes, which reduces the costs to those who are not 
regular players in the regulatory arena of determining what is at stake in 
the proceeding. 
The presidential control model has replaced the interest group model as 
the predominant justification for the administrative state.
74
 Like the 
interest group model, however, the presidential control model views 
politics as playing a legitimate role in administrative rulemaking. 
According to that model, the president, answering to the entire electorate, 
 
 
 71. For example, the Clean Air Act, requires that EPA ―shall by regulation prescribe . . . 
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class . . . of new motor vehicles . . . 
which in [the EPA Administrator‘s] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution . . . 
reasonably. . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.‖ 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1). The Supreme 
Court read this statute to require that the EPA regulate greenhouse gases unless the EPA ―determines 
that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or . . . provides some reasonable explanation 
as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.‖ Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007).  
 72. See Jonathan Weinberg, The Right to be Taken Seriously (Feb. 29, 2012), in SOC. SCI. 
RESEARCH NETWORK, 1–2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013567 
(SSRN abstract and link to download paper) (noting that administrative agencies must engage any 
relevant comments and respond to them, which gives rise to a ―right to be taken seriously‖). 
 73. See Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 
59 TEX. L. REV. 1175, 1190–91 (1981) (noting that judges can pick and choose which of scores or 
even hundreds of statutory factors were relevant); Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 68, at 
300–01 (―[F]actors that a judge on the reviewing court likely will find relevant to his determination of 
the acceptability of the agency action will depend significantly on the identity of the reviewing 
judge.‖). 
 74. See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 17, at 485–92; see also Farina, supra note 
17, at 988; Staszewski, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 12, at 851.  
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has incentives to act in the best interest of the country,
75
 which might 
suggest that there is no need for judicial review to counteract special 
interest group influence. But, any casual observer of politics knows that 
the president is not immune from influence of focused groups whose 
interests may not accord with those of the nation as a whole.
76
 The 
presidential control model therefore can avoid the problems of undue 
influence of special interest groups only if the actions of the president are 
transparent to the public in the strong sense that the public can understand 
the costs and benefits that presidential policies impose on the various 
interest groups that help focus the electorate‘s attention and ultimately 
deliver votes. And, experience with recent imperial presidents provides 
ample evidence that, without some mechanism to ensure such strong 
transparency, the president can obfuscate the extent to which he has 
influenced rulemaking. Even when the president‘s influence is recognized, 
the lack of transparency allows him to hide the effects of his policies.
77
 
Thus, the presidential control model does not obviate the need for hard-
look review.  
3. The Place of Politics in Reasoned Decision-Making 
Given the role of reasoned decision-making within the interest group 
model and by extension the presidential control model, the question 
remains: what is the proper place of politics within that standard of 
review? Unfortunately, language in both scholarship and opinions by 
Justice Breyer seem to support Watts‘s belief that judges are skeptical of 
political influence on agency decisions.
78
 But, a careful reading of 
Breyer‘s arguments leads me to believe that even his understanding of the 
hard-look standard does not condemn or even devalue the political choices 
that influence the agency decisions.
79
 Those influences are simply not 
relevant to the reviewing court‘s inquiry if the hard-look test is to provide 
 
 
 75. Kagan, supra note 5, at 2331–32; Mashaw, supra note 19, at 95. 
 76. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1306 (2006) (opining that the president is subject to the same interest 
group pressures as agency officials). 
 77. See Staszewski, Deliberative Democracy, supra note 12, at 867. Compare Bressman, Beyond 
Accountability, supra note 17, at 506–10 (criticizing Kagan‘s reliance on presidential control over 
agencies as insufficient to prevent unjustifiable regulation because of various mechanisms by which 
the administration could obfuscate the motivations and effects of its involvement); with Kagan, supra 
note 5, at 2337, 2383–84 (noting that presidential control will best reflect broad public sentiments 
when it is most visible, but concluding that having the president simply take responsibility for agency 
policies is sufficient transparency). 
 78. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 79. See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
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appropriate checks on agency action as required by the interest group 
model. 
Like the model from which it derives, reasoned decision-making 
review recognizes that agency rulemaking will be inherently political in 
the sense that it will require an agency to make value judgments that are 
not strictly dictated by applying the law to a set of facts.
80
 The reasoned 
decision-making standard is exacting in that courts will look at the 
agency‘s explanation of its decision, often in excruciating detail, to ensure 
that the agency identified and explicitly considered all relevant factors in 
reaching its outcome.
81
 But the standard explicitly admonishes judges not 
to substitute their judgments for those of the agency.
82
 Underlying this 
admonition is the understanding that regulatory value judgments are not 
dictated by legally discernible standards and are therefore inherently 
political.
83
 The judiciary, being the branch least directly accountable to the 
polity, has no business second guessing such judgments.
84
 In essence, the 
arbitrary and capricious standard recognizes that the political arena is the 
appropriate forum for constraining value choices made by the agency in 
rulemaking. It does not deny that politics plays a legitimate and even vital 
role in agency choices,
85
 but it does recognize that courts are ill-suited to 
evaluate the bona fides of value choices and hence of political influence.  
 
 
 80. See Scalia, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 35, at 196–97; Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, 
supra note 30, at 1538–40; cf. Samuel G. Brooks, Note and Comment, FCC v. Fox Television Stations 
and the Role of Logical Error in Hard Look Review, 2010 BYU L. REV. 687, 698–99 (2010) 
(recognizing the distinction between what may motivate an agency decision and what may formally 
justify it and noting that ―hard look review may not always effectively deter agencies from basing their 
decisions on political factors in practice‖). 
 81. See Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 856, 880–81 (2007) (asserting that the ―‗hard-look‘ doctrine is generally quite rigorous and 
imposes a substantial burden on both agencies and courts‖). 
 82. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (The arbitrary 
and capricious review is ―searching and careful, [but] the ultimate standard of review is . . . narrow. 
. . . [and] [t]he court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.‖). 
 83. See Scalia, Role of the Judiciary, supra note 35, at 196–97. The problem with courts 
imposing their value judgments in the absence of legal standards is explicitly recognized in the factors 
the Supreme Court uses to determine when a controversy is a nonjusticiable political question. See 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214, 217 (1962) (listing ―lack of judicially discoverable standards‖ and 
―impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion‖ as two of six factors that identify nonjusticiable political questions). 
 84. See Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, supra note 31, at 289. Article III includes an implicit 
premise that courts should ―refrain[] from second guessing a decision by a political branch when doing 
so will require the court to rely heavily on policy.‖ Id. 
 85. Glen Staszewski recently advocated that agencies should be able to use value judgments to 
justify a rule, but only when the outcome is close in terms of technical considerations. See Staszewski, 
Deliberative Democracy, supra note 12, at 899–912. In such a situation, he would require the agency 
to try to use the value judgments of the public as reflected in rulemaking comments but suggests that 
the ultimate value choice should be the agency‘s and that it would not be adequate to rely on that of 
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Nonetheless, under the interest group model of the administrative state 
and, by extension, the presidential control model,
86
 there is a role for 
judicial review to facilitate proper operation of the political arena. Hard-
look review serves this function by requiring the agency to separate the 
empirical findings and predictions underlying its action from the value 
choices inherent in that action. That is, the agency must describe and 
defend the impact its decision is likely to have relative to other possible 
regulatory paths it could have pursued. This description and its 
comparison to the impacts of alternative actions allow those interested in 
the decision to understand the trade-offs inherent in the agency‘s value 
choices without having to invest greatly in educating themselves about the 
technical details of the subject of regulation.
87
 Most significantly, 
however, it avoids imposing on an agency the reviewing court‘s 
perception of which value choices are legitimate and which are not.  
 
 
the president. Id. at 884. Although this sounds similar to my reading of what reasoned decision-making 
requires, it differs in some fundamental respects. First, I do not think that one can use technical criteria 
alone to winnow most rulemaking choices to close calls. The use of science itself involves value 
judgments and the prevalence of differences in how reasonable people evaluate trade-offs between 
rulemaking outcomes leads me to believe that agency decisions will virtually always rely to a great 
extent on value judgments. See Meazell, supra note 39, at 743. Second, the extent to which an agency 
can glean a public preference of values based on rulemaking comments is subject to biases in who 
participates in rulemaking and how. Relying primarily on such comments is therefore not a reliable 
indication of public values. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 
ADMIN. L. REV. 411, 412, 490–91 (2005) (reporting an empirical study showing that members of the 
public are interested in participating in rulemaking and that agencies take the diffuse public‘s interests 
into account, but the public‘s influence in rulemaking is limited by the inability to participate in a 
sophisticated manner); Mendelson, supra note 18, at 1372 (―There is a risk of ‗astroturfing,‘ when 
groups form that purport to—but do not really—represent grassroots interests, potentially giving an 
agency an incorrect picture of public preferences.‖). Third, even adopting deliberative democracy as 
one‘s model for the administrative state, I do not see why the agency head should not be able to factor 
in the value judgments of the president in choosing the ultimate rule. See Levin, Hard Look Review, 
supra note 10, at 561 (stating, with respect to regulatory policy changes, that ―elections should have 
consequences‖). But see Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular 
Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 457–62 (2010) (arguing that the 
presidential election does not reflect predominantly shared voter preferences on individual agency 
actions because of numerous disconnects between such actions and the electoral process). 
 86. See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying text. 
 87. Lisa Bressman has justified hard-look review as a means of enforcing the norm against 
unprincipled agency action. I read Bressman as agreeing with my understanding of hard-look review, 
which in her words ―requires agencies to filter information for ordinary consumption, minimizing 
informational asymmetries between administrator and legislator.‖ Bressman, Procedures as Politics, 
supra note 56, at 1780; see also Bressman, supra note 17, Beyond Accountability, at 529 (asserting 
that reasoned decision-making ―may promote accountability by ensuring public participation in or 
oversight of the administrative process‖); cf. Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1143 (2001) (viewing 
cost-benefit analysis as performing a similar role).  
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C. Case Law and the Underpinnings of Reasoned Decision-Making  
Watts asserts that the technocratic approach to judicial review, which 
she finds problematic, is embodied in the Supreme Court cases of State 
Farm and Massachusetts v. EPA.
88
 Although she is correct that those cases 
do not invite agencies to proffer political influence as a factor in arbitrary 
and capricious review, those cases do not support her understanding that 
courts consider political influences to be illegitimate motivations for 
rulemaking.  
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration‘s (NHTSA) 
regulation of automobile passive restraints—originally requiring the 
installation of seatbelts or airbags—certainly tracked the politics of who 
was in the White House.
89
 Yet, as Watts emphasizes, the Court did not 
consider this factor in evaluating the Reagan administration‘s decision to 
abandon requiring passive restraints in automobiles.
90
 According to Watts, 
the Court focused on the agency‘s failure to consider whether air bags 
alone would provide sufficient safety benefits. The Court also questioned 
NHTSA‘s dismissal of the safety of automatic seatbelts.91 Watts, however, 
elides direct indications that the Court understood and accepted that 
politics motivated the decision.
92
  
A crucial passage from the State Farm majority, included in Watts‘s 
excerpt, explains that an agency must consider all relevant factors and 
important aspects of a problem.
93
 But that passage also points out that a 
court will not reverse an agency determination on grounds that it reflects 
an error of judgment unless the explanation ―is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.‖94 The term ―difference in view‖ indicates that the agency is 
entitled to rely on value judgments as bases for challenged rules. The 
Court simply does not focus on those directly because, in my opinion, it 
has no business second guessing them. 
 
 
 88. Watts, supra note 7, at 19, 21–22. 
 89. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 761, 770 (2008) (noting that the rule adopted while Carter was president was rescinded 
within six months of Reagan taking office). 
 90. Watts, supra note 7, at 6. 
 91. Id. at 17–19. 
 92. Id. at 19. 
 93. Id. at 17. 
 94. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(emphasis added). 
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One might argue that, by allowing a court to reverse an agency 
decision that the court believes to be a clear error in judgment, the court 
imposes an objective rationality requirement on agency value judgments.
95
 
After all, if hard-look review leaves agencies free to make value 
judgments without judicial constraint, how can a court justify rejecting 
such a judgment? To understand this component of hard-look review, one 
must first recognize that, unlike the process-based components of such 
review, courts rarely, if ever, use the clear error in judgment standard to 
invalidate agency policy choices.
96
 Courts essentially include the clear 
error standard as part of hard-look review to cover those cases in which 
the agency‘s purported value judgment is inconsistent with any value that 
could reasonably be attributed to the statute. When that is the case, it is 
almost certain that the rule reflects some unstated rationale, which is 
unstated either because the agency‘s authorizing statute precludes its use 
or because the agency does not want to suffer the political ramification for 
revealing this justification. For example, adopting a rule that has no 
justification except to pay back an interest group that strongly supported 
the president‘s campaign would be arbitrary,97 and the president would not 
want to reveal that rationale even if it was not. In short, courts allow 
reversal for clear error of judgment only if the agency explanation is so 
incredible that it is fairly certainly pretextual, which is consistent with the 
explanation of hard-look review as being meant to increase the 
transparency of agency decisions.  
Watts also notes that the majority parted ways with Justice Rehnquist, 
who concurred in the judgment but dissented on the question of whether 
the agency‘s prediction about detachable seatbelts was arbitrary and 
capricious.
98
 She further points out that, although this finding was not a 
necessary part of his decision, Rehnquist opined that: ―A change in 
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a 
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency‘s reappraisal of the 
costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.‖99 While Watts does not 
 
 
 95. See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 64, at 1054 (asserting that hard-look review was given a 
―substantive cast . . . when the Supreme Court suggested that reviewing courts should ensure not only 
that agencies consider the relevant factors, but also that agencies have made no ‗clear error of 
judgment‘‖). 
 96. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 366 (4th ed. 
1998).  
 97. See Mendelson, ―Political‖ Oversight, supra note 7, at 1144–45; cf. Watts, supra note 7, at 
65 (stating that a congressman‘s ―hardball‖ threat should not be considered to justify agency 
decisions). 
 98. Watts, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
 99. Id. at 18 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass‘n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
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read too much into the majority‘s failure to respond to this point, she 
indicates that scholars have widely read the majority‘s disagreement with 
Justice Rehnquist ―to represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of 
politics.‖100 
Reading the State Farm majority‘s refusal to address politics as an 
expression of antipathy toward political influence in agency decision-
making is, as Watts concedes, problematic because the agency itself did 
not rely on such influence to justify its decision.
101
 In some sense, 
Rehnquist‘s statement is off the mark because the agency premised its 
decision on a prediction that automatic seatbelts would be disabled and 
hence would provide little benefit.
102
 Having done so, it is incumbent on 
the agency to analyze this prediction and explain why it is reasonable in 
light of all factors likely to bear on its accuracy, which the majority 
believed included the factor of inertia facing occupants who might not 
want to buckle up.
103
 The prediction of likely usage of automatic seatbelts 
is an empirical question rather than a value judgment on which politics has 
any legitimate bearing.  
Under my understanding of hard-look review, had the agency wanted 
to rely on politics to justify its decision, it would have had to identify the 
policy preferences underlying that reliance. Only by doing so can the 
agency be held politically accountable for its decision. For example, had 
NHTSA objectively evaluated the benefits of imposing a passive restraint 
rule, but declined to impose such a rule based on its valuation of the 
autonomy of car owners to buy the cars that they prefer, I believe that the 
majority would have had to accept this valuation as reasonable.
104
 The 
agency, however, probably would not have relied on this valuation, both 
because it did not resonate with popular sentiments and because the Court 
might have held that automobile owner autonomy was outside the factors 
that the agency‘s authorizing statute allowed it to consider.105 Given the 
 
 
59, 43 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 100. Id. at 19. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 47.  
 103. Id. at 52, 54. 
 104. See Scalia, Rulemaking as Politics, supra note 32, at xxxi (commenting on the D.C. Circuit‘s 
rejection of NHTSA‘s decision to reverse its passive restraint rule: ―[I]t would be refreshing and 
instructive if . . . [NHTSA had] said flat out: ‗It is our judgment that people should not be strapped in 
cars if they don‘t want to be; nor should they have to spend substantial sums for air-bags if they choose 
otherwise.‘‖). 
 105. Given that the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 authorized regulation 
of ―unreasonable risk,‖ Pub. L. No. 89-563 § 102(1), 80 Stat. 718, 718 (codified at 4 U.S.C. 
§ 30121(a)(1)(D) (2012)), it is not clear whether courts would have found driver autonomy to be 
outside those factors the statute allowed the agency to consider.  
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constraints of politics and the statute, the agency tried to hide a political 
decision behind a misleading technical explanation, and the Court properly 
rejected this technical obfuscation. 
Watts also sees Massachusetts v. EPA as signaling judicial antipathy 
for political influence on agency decision-making.
106
 In that case, the EPA 
denied a petition to commence a rulemaking proceeding to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions on various grounds, including that regulation 
under the Clean Air Act would conflict with the Bush Administration‘s 
policies and efforts to work out a global approach to climate change.
107
 
The Court held that the EPA arguments were not sufficient to justify 
refusing to regulate because the statute required the agency to determine 
whether human-generated greenhouse gases contribute to global warming 
or to explain why it cannot or should not make that determination.
108
  
The Massachusetts v. EPA majority did refuse to credit the EPA‘s 
arguments that there were political reasons why it decided not to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, the Court‘s decision seems to dismiss 
political explanations in this case as illegitimate. This is surprising, 
especially given that the Court was reviewing a decision not to commence 
rulemaking. Under the deferential standard of review that courts often 
apply to such decisions, statements that the agency prefers to devote its 
rulemaking resources to other regulatory endeavors usually pass judicial 
muster.
109
 Thus, Watts is not alone in seeing the majority‘s opinion as 
rejecting arguments that the agency may be influenced by politics in a 
context where that influence does not seem problematic.
110
 But, one can 
read Massachusetts v. EPA as supporting my view of the role of politics as 
well. The Court did not claim that politics was irrelevant to how the 
agency chose to regulate, but it read the Clean Air Act as predicating 
 
 
 106. Watts, supra note 7, at 21–22. 
 107. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511–14 (2007) (summarizing EPA denial of 
rulemaking petition). 
 108. Id. at 533. 
 109. In Massachusetts v. EPA, however, the agency had already committed to seeking notice and 
comments and did not rely on its discretion to invest its regulatory resources where it thought they 
could do the most good. Id. at 511–13. Under established circuit court precedent, courts review such 
denials of rulemaking petitions under the usual hard-look standards, but arguably, in such situations, 
they are less apt to hold that an agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously for failing to collect data and 
perform analyses it would need to determine the extent to which regulation was justified. See, e.g., 
Prof‘l Pilots Fed‘n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 764, 769–70 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (claiming to apply the hard-
look doctrine because the agency refusal to initiate a rulemaking was on the merits, but tolerating the 
agency refusal to create opportunities to generate data to see if the rule was sensible).  
 110. See, e.g., Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 52 (reading Massachusetts as creating a 
doctrine of expertise-forcing ―to ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside 
political pressures‖). 
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whether to regulate at all on scientific determinations.
111
 Hence, by the 
majority‘s view, it was Congress that rejected the political factors that the 
agency relied on to justify its decision, not the Court invoking the hard-
look test.  
Finally, Watts is encouraged by the recent decision in Fox Television, 
in which the majority upheld a change in FCC rules that prohibited a 
television station from broadcasting fleeting expletives even if used other 
than in their sexual or scatological sense.
112
 The central holding of the Fox 
Television majority is that an agency need not satisfy a stiffer standard 
when it changes a policy than when it adopts a policy in the first place.
113
 
In Fox Television, Watts sees an easing of the burden on agencies to 
justify changes in policy that may reflect political decisions.
114
 She finds 
especially encouraging that Justice Scalia, in part of the opinion joined by 
three other justices, ―frankly acknowledged [that the change in policy] was 
‗spurred by significant political pressure from Congress.‘‖115  
But, as I explained previously, recognizing the legitimacy of political 
pressure on rulemaking is not a change from traditional hard-look review. 
Scalia‘s opinion never relied on political pressure as a basis for reducing 
the stringency of the judicial inquiry into the reasons the agency gave for 
its action. In fact, his recognition of the political pressure was in rebuttal to 
Justice Stevens‘s dissent, which argued that independent agencies were 
meant to be responsive to Congress, not just the president.
116
 Scalia cited 
political pressure only to note that the FCC was in fact responding to the 
desires of members of Congress.
117
 He intimated that Stevens could not 
have it both ways—contending that agencies were to respond to Congress 
but could not take congressional pressure into account when setting 
policy.
118
 Thus, if there is anything to celebrate in Scalia‘s Fox Television 
opinion, it is the clarification that political influence is appropriate in the 
 
 
 111. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 533—34. 
 112. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 517–18 (2009). 
 113. Id. at 514. 
 114. Watts, supra note 7, at 22. 
 115. Id. (quoting Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 523). 
 116. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 539–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the FCC, as an 
independent agency, is an agent of Congress and not the president and, as such, is particularly bound 
by its statutory mandate). 
 117. Id. at 523. 
 118. Id. at 524–25 (―Justice Stevens‘ conclusion does not follow from his premise. If the FCC is 
indeed an agency of Congress, it would seem an adequate explanation of its change of position that 
Congress made clear its wishes for stricter enforcement . . . .‖). 
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face of arguable suggestions by Justices Breyer and Stevens to the 
contrary.
119
 
Even this understanding of the Fox Television opinions is questionable, 
however, because a careful reading of Justice Breyer‘s dissent indicates 
that he was not advocating that agency decisions be apolitical. The 
impression that Breyer‘s opinion holds that political pressure is not a 
legitimate motivation for agency decisions is created by his unfortunate 
phrasing of his description of ―applicable law,‖ which states: ―[The law] 
does not permit [agencies] to make policy choices for purely political 
reasons nor to rest them primarily upon unexplained policy 
preferences.‖120 But, later in the opinion, he clarifies that he does not mean 
that agency decisions must be free from politics. He writes: 
 I recognize that sometimes the ultimate explanation for a change 
may have to be, ―We now weigh the relevant considerations 
differently.‖ But at other times, an agency can and should say more. 
Where, for example, the agency rested its previous policy on 
particular factual findings or where an agency rested its prior policy 
on its view of the governing law, or where an agency rested its 
previous policy on, say, a special need to coordinate with another 
agency, one would normally expect the agency to focus upon those 
earlier views of fact, of law, or of policy and explain why they are 
no longer controlling.
121
  
In essence, Breyer‘s dissent in Fox Television explains that agencies 
may rely on changes in value judgments, and presumably these may be 
prompted by political changes. But, an agency must explain those policy 
choices by establishing the underlying factual and legal predicates to its 
action so that it can be held accountable for the value choices it makes. 
While Watts focuses on the few Supreme Court cases applying 
arbitrary and capricious review, lower court cases provide clear indications 
that although courts do not entertain invocations of political pressure 
under such review, they fully accept that agencies frequently are driven by 
political pressure.
122
 Perhaps no case illustrates this nuanced conception of 
 
 
 119. See id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing the view that independent agencies are 
―established ‗to carry into effect legislative policies embodied in the[ir] [enabling] statute‘‖ (quoting 
Humphrey‘s Ex‘r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935))); Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 547 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the law does not allow independent agencies to set policy for 
―purely political reasons‖). 
 120. Id. at 547. 
 121. Id. at 550–51 (citations omitted). 
 122. See infra notes 123–47 and accompanying text. 
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the role of politics better than Sierra Club v. Costle.
123
 In that case, the 
D.C. Circuit considered EPA rules implementing the 1977 amendments to 
the Clean Air Act‘s new source performance standards provisions.124 
These amendments reflected efforts by competing coalitions of 
environmentalists, power plant owners, and eastern coal interests to try to 
influence the standard the EPA ultimately would have to adopt.
125
 The 
statute was far from determinative about which interests would win out.
126
  
The agency adopted a standard that resulted in dirtier air at greater cost 
than an alternative it had considered because the adopted standard 
provided greater protections to eastern coal interests.
127
 Senator Robert 
Byrd, from the coal-producing state of West Virginia actively met with the 
agency and seemed to have persuaded the White House to get involved in 
the rulemaking proceeding to support his preferred standard, which was 
ultimately adopted.
128
 Despite the perversity of the effects of the standard, 
the politics behind it, and the scores of pages the court wrote on technical 
questions about the agency decision as part of its hard-look review,
129
 the 
court affirmed the agency ultimately because its analysis clearly showed 
that the adopted standard helped protect eastern coal producers. The court 
noted that encouraging use of local coal was one of numerous purposes of 
the statute.
130
 In response to objections about meetings with the president 
that the EPA had not docketed, Judge Wald wrote for the court: 
Of course, it is always possible that undisclosed Presidential 
prodding may direct an outcome that is factually based on the 
record, but different from the outcome that would have [been] 
obtained in the absence of Presidential involvement. In such a case, 
it would be true that the political process did affect the outcome in a 
way the courts could not police. But we do not believe that 
Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemaking into 
 
 
 123. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 124. Id. at 316. 
 125. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS 
AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 29–33 (1981). 
 126. Id. at 107. 
 127. Id. at 33–35. 
 128. Id. at 100–02. 
 129. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 318–84 (applying hard-look review to the technical issues raised 
by the EPA adoption of the standard). The court‘s review was so extensive, it prompted Judge Wald to 
write: ―We reach our decision after interminable record searching (and considerable soul searching). 
We have read the record with as hard a look as mortal judges can probably give its thousands of 
pages.‖ Id. at 410. 
 130. Id. at 339–40. 
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a rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political 
considerations or the presence of Presidential power.
131
 
In response to objections of undue congressional influence on the 
agency decision, Judge Wald stated: 
D.C. [Circuit precedent] requires that two conditions be met before 
an administrative rulemaking may be overturned simply on the 
grounds of Congressional pressure. First, the content of the pressure 
upon the Secretary is designed to force him to decide upon factors 
not made relevant by Congress in the applicable statute. . . . Second, 
the Secretary‘s determination must be affected by those extraneous 
considerations.
132
 
What is telling about these quotes is the clarity with which they 
distinguish between the influences to which agencies might respond and 
what the courts can actually police. This oft-cited case on hard-look 
review manifests that although political influence is not relevant to such 
review, it is a normal—even desirable—input into agency rulemaking.133  
The Three Sisters Bridge case,
134
 although it involves informal 
adjudication rather than rulemaking, provides a factual scenario that 
illuminates the differences between my understanding of hard-look review 
and a review that would credit agencies‘ reliance on politics to justify their 
actions. The case involved a proposed bridge that would have provided an 
interstate highway connection between Virginia and the waterfront of 
Georgetown in Washington, D.C.
135
 The project required the approval of 
 
 
 131. Id. at 408. 
 132. Id. at 409. 
 133. Watts acknowledges that Sierra Club embraces the political influence of agency rulemaking. 
Watts, supra note 7, at 38. Apparently, however, she sees this embrace as occurring only in the context 
of the law of ex parte contacts because she ignores the scores of pages Judge Wald‘s opinion devotes 
to technically focused hard-look review of the EPA rule. See id. at 39. The natural implication of 
Watts‘s reading of this case is that Judge Wald recognized the importance of political influence when 
evaluating communication between the agency and the president and members of Congress in a 
rulemaking proceeding but considered that same influence illegitimate when evaluating the substance 
of the rule. To me, this description of how judges decide cases strains credibility. As my description of 
the Sierra Club holding illustrates, I believe that Judge Wald embraced the importance of political 
influence with respect both to the necessity of communications between the agency and its political 
principals and to the desirability of informing the agency‘s ultimate value judgments. She did not, 
however, rely on political influence to conclude that the agency decisions were justified. See generally 
Sierra Club, 657 F.2d 298. 
 134. D.C. Fed‘n of Civic Ass‘ns v. Volpe (Three Sisters Bridge case), 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
 135. Id. at 1236. 
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the District of Columbia Council and the Secretary of Transportation.
136
 
Because the bridge would have used parkland, the Secretary had to find 
that there was no feasible alternative to the bridge to move traffic between 
Virginia and Georgetown.
137
 In making this finding, the Secretary was to 
weigh the value of parkland heavily.
138
  
Congressman Natcher, the chairman of the Subcommittee on the 
District of Columbia of the House of Representatives, was a strong 
advocate for the bridge.
139
 He threatened that Congress would withhold 
funding for construction of the District‘s subway system if the Council did 
not approve the bridge.
140
 Although a majority of the Council voted to 
approve the bridge project, several swing voters protested vociferously 
that they voted to approve the measure only because of Representative 
Natcher‘s threat.141 Secretary of Transportation Volpe, apparently 
recognizing the support of key members of Congress for the bridge, 
rushed the project through the approval process.
142
 
The D.C. Circuit reversed Volpe‘s approval of the project, finding that 
the record did not support the government‘s contention that the Secretary 
had followed all the statutorily required procedures and considered 
alternatives that involved not building any bridge.
143
 In this sense, the case 
was easy. Judge Bazelon, however, also indicated that, for him, the impact 
of Representative Natcher‘s threat by itself justified the reversal of the 
Secretary‘s approval.144 This raises the question whether the court should 
have reversed the approval if Volpe had followed the required procedures 
and considered the alternatives.  
Under my approach, the District Council‘s response to the threat 
regarding the withholding of subway funds constituted a justification that 
 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
 138. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411–13.  
 139. Three Sisters Bridge case, 459 F.2d at 1236, 1245–46. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 1236, 1245. 
 142. Id. Volpe, citing congressional authorization of funding for the bridge, initially approved the 
bridge without even sending it through the statutorily required process. Id. at 1237–39. The 
determination that Congress had excepted the bridge from this process was reversed in an earlier 
decision in the case. D.C. Fed‘n of Civic Ass‘ns, Inc. v. Volpe, 434 F.2d 436, 436, 445–47 (D.C. Cir. 
1970).  
 143. Three Sisters Bridge case, 459 F.2d at 1237–40. 
 144. Id. at 1245. The other judges on the panel did not join this part of Judge Bazelon‘s opinion. 
See id. at 1246 (noting that Judge Fahy did not find a need to address this issue); id. at 1256–57 
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting in part) (explaining that he was not convinced that Representative 
Natcher‘s pressure had changed the Secretary‘s evaluation of the project).  
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was not relevant to the approval of the bridge.
145
 The threat was irrelevant 
not because it was political, but rather because the subway funding had no 
logical relation to the bridge—it was simply an attempt to leverage 
political power. Under the hard-look doctrine, the court would have been 
justified in reversing the approval. Watts indicates that she too would find 
invocation of the threat insufficient to justify approval of the bridge,
146
 
although it is not clear why given that Representative Natcher‘s threat was 
hardly unusual in the push and pull of politics.
147
 
A starker contrast between my approach and that of Watts is presented 
by considering another variation on the facts of the Three Sisters Bridge 
case. Suppose first that Representative Natcher‘s subcommittee publicly 
expressed strong desire for the bridge in an official subcommittee report, 
but said nothing about funds for the subway. Suppose further, however, 
that the Secretary understood that Natcher could deliver votes to kill 
funding for the subway if the bridge was not approved. Finally, postulate 
that the Secretary had met the technical procedural and consideration 
requirements of the statute but had justified the impact on parkland by 
invoking Congress‘s political support for the bridge. Although such 
political influence is clearly legitimate, as I understand hard-look review, 
the court should nonetheless reverse the Secretary‘s determination for 
failing to explain why the benefits of building the bridge outweighed the 
loss of parkland.
148
 In contrast, if Watts‘s proposal has any teeth at all, it 
would demand that the reviewing court uphold the approval based on the 
subcommittee‘s expression of support for the bridge. 
II. THE NORMATIVE CASE AGAINST POLITICS IN ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS REVIEW  
In part, Professor Watts‘s characterization of reasoned decision-making 
as antagonistic to political influence on rulemaking leads her to claim that 
allowing agencies to rely explicitly on politics to justify their regulatory 
 
 
 145. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (opining that the threat to withhold subway 
funds in the Three Sisters Bridge case was not among the factors relevant to the determination of 
whether the bridge in that case should be built).  
 146. See Watts, supra note 7, at 65. 
 147. The threat was not only unusual, it was extremely credible. Representative Natcher‘s 
subcommittee had gotten Congress to withhold funds for the subway and released those funds only 
after the Council voted to approve the bridge. Three Sisters Bridge case, 459 F.2d at 1245. 
 148. To clarify my understanding, had Secretary Volpe explained why the bridge was warranted 
despite its use of parkland without invoking his reading of Congress‘s preference, the court would be 
justified in affirming the approval despite the political motivation for the Secretary‘s decision. See 
supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.  
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decisions would change arbitrary and capricious review for the better.
149
 
She describes the benefits of her proposal as making agency decisions 
more honest and keeping courts in check.
150
 Most significantly, she argues 
that allowing agencies to invoke politics will reveal the true basis of many 
agency decisions, which will make agencies‘ decisions more 
accountable.
151
 Additionally, she contends that allowing agencies to rely 
on political preferences of the administration will relieve agencies from 
pressure to manipulate science to justify their decisions, thereby 
encouraging agencies to be more honest about the science behind their 
decisions.
152
 As a third point, Watts concludes that her proposal would 
decrease the ossification of rulemaking because agencies will not have to 
spend time and resources on factual and scientific determinations that do 
not influence their decisions.
153
 A proper understanding of the role of 
hard-look review in the administrative process, however, suggests that 
Watts‘s normative assessment on all three points is problematic.  
A. Transparency and Political Accountability for Regulations  
Essentially, Watts‘s proposal would allow agencies to substitute the 
invocation of political preferences for at least some development of facts 
and reasoning about impacts of agency regulations. Although Watts never 
explicitly addresses how political factors should be balanced alongside 
technical ones,
154
 she indicates that invocation of politics, in some 
instances, should allow an agency rule to pass hard-look review that would 
not pass as courts currently apply that standard.
155
 Also, as she would 
incorporate politics into judicial review, politics would never disqualify a 
regulation that otherwise would meet the hard-look standard.
156
 By 
 
 
 149. Watts, supra note 7, at 16–20, 32–33, 84. 
 150. Id. at 33–34. 
 151. Id. at 42–45. Although this is the last argument Watts presents, she labels it as perhaps the 
most important one. Id. at 42. 
 152. Id. at 41–42. 
 153. Id. at 42–45. 
 154. Id. at 72–73. 
 155. See id. at 73. 
 156. Id. at 76 (noting that, under her proposal, agencies would get additional deference for 
revealing political reasons, but would pay no price for not invoking them). Because agencies would 
not have to reveal political influence on which they did not rely to justify a rule, Watts‘s proposal 
would allow them to conceal improper political influence. Id. Watts recognizes this problem, and 
therefore expresses some willingness to allow courts to reverse agencies for failure to reveal political 
influence on which he rule was based. Id. at 76–77. She points out, however, that a requirement that 
courts require agencies to reveal political communications is fraught with constitutional difficulties 
and problems of judicial competence. Id. at 76.  
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implication, political considerations would substitute for the missing 
analysis that would render a decision arbitrary and capricious under the 
current invocation of the standard.  
The idea behind Watts‘s proposal is that the electorate will evaluate 
whether it agrees with the political decision. That public evaluation will 
constrain the president from encouraging the agency to act in a manner 
that is not politically supported. By her account, hard-look review hinders 
the openness of political influence on agency regulation.
157
 As I argued 
above, however, hard-look review does not condemn political influence. It 
merely recognizes that presidential and congressional influences often do 
not reflect political support for the precise trade-offs that an agency 
regulation entails. Contrary to Watts‘s contentions, allowing an agency to 
fall back on general recitation of presidential support for a rule permits the 
agency to hide the details of the value judgments it makes. Generally, 
political support for a policy is not all-or-nothing. There may be political 
support for a policy similar to the one the agency adopts, yet that support 
may depend on how far the agency takes that policy—that is, on the trade-
offs that stakeholders will have to make if the agency acts as the president 
desires. Under my conception of hard-look review, the agency has to 
develop a record that will indicate and support its best assessment of the 
impact of its policy in terms of benefits bestowed and costs engendered. 
The case of Rust v. Sullivan
158
 provides an illuminating example of 
how Watts‘s proposal allows an agency to escape from having to reveal 
the true nature of its value judgments. Rust involved the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) in the Reagan Administration 
changing an interpretation of the meaning of a provision in Title X of the 
Public Health Service Act, which prohibits federal money made available 
under that Title from ―be[ing] used in programs where abortion is a 
method of family planning.‖159 The new interpretation prohibited 
recipients of Title X funds—including doctors—from counseling women 
about abortion.
160
 The case generated a heated debate among the justices 
about the First Amendment in the context of government-funded 
activity,
161
 but I want to focus on the administrative law question of 
whether the agency rule was consistent with the Act.
162
  
 
 
 157. Id. at 23–26. 
 158. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 159. Id. at 177–79 (quoting Public Health Services Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1970)). 
 160. Id. at 179–80. 
 161. Id. at 192–205, 208–20, 224–25. 
 162. See id. at 183. 
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The Court applied Chevron and held at step one that the statute was 
ambiguous about the precise meaning of programs where abortion is a 
method of family planning.
163
 The Court explicitly concluded that the 
statute was silent about whether recipients of Title X funds can engage in 
counseling about abortion, but that the agency‘s interpretation was clearly 
within bounds allowed by the statute.
164
 With respect to step two of 
Chevron, comments in the rulemaking indicated that even though the rule 
applied only to abortion as family planning, the agency interpretation was 
problematic because it would prohibit doctors in family planning clinics 
from informing women for whom childbirth might pose a significant risk 
to their lives and health about abortion as an option.
165
 Comments also 
expressed concern that the new interpretation might keep women who 
ultimately choose abortion from doing so in a timely manner, thereby 
exposing them to later term procedures that pose greater risks to their 
health.
166
 The comments noted that many women who use family planning 
clinics do not have personal physicians who would otherwise inform them 
of the abortion option.
167
 The agency never assessed the effect of its rule 
on risks to the health of Title X clients,
168
 but merely opined that there is 
an adequate basis for the rule because it is reasonable under all 
circumstances.
169
 The Court held that the agency had adequately justified 
its changed interpretation as necessary to prevent abuses and the 
 
 
 163. Id. at 184. 
 164. Id.  
 165. See Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion is a 
Method of Family Planning, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922, 2929 (Feb. 2, 1988) [hereinafter Abortion Counseling 
Regulations] (reporting comments expressing concern that the rule ―would require physicians to 
remain silent when confronted with a pregnant patient with medical conditions which may be 
exacerbated by pregnancy, such as diabetes, multiple sclerosis, lupus, or AIDS‖); see also id. at 2932 
(essentially admitting that the rule would preclude communication about abortion to a patient for 
whom childbirth might pose a threat to life or health by stating that precluding the doctor from 
discussing abortion in such a situation would not violate medical ethics).  
 166. See id. at 2936 (summarizing such comments); Id. at 2938 (responding that such delay has 
the beneficial effect of ―allow[ing] sufficient time for reflection prior to making an informed decision‖ 
and, in any case, is consistent with the statute, which clearly intended that abortion not be facilitated 
through the Title X program). 
 167. See id. at 2925 (indicating that some family planning providers argued that ―for many Title X 
clients, the Title X project constitutes their only source of health care‖). 
 168. The drafters did change the rule to include what some might term an exception—obligating 
Title X providers to provide clients with immediate referrals to appropriate medical facilities when 
confronted with immediately life-threatening emergencies, such as ectopic pregnancies. Id. at 2937. 
 169. Id. at 2925 (citing Chevron). In doing so, the agency confuses Chevron‘s instruction to 
reviewing courts with the standard an agency should meet in interpreting a statute. See Mark 
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency 
Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 111 & n.157 (1994) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, A 
Syncopated Chevron].  
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appearance that funds were being used to support abortion.
170
 Most 
relevant to this article, the agency explained that the new interpretation 
was ―supported by a shift in attitude against the ‗elimination of unborn 
children by abortion.‘‖171  
Essentially in Rust, under step two of Chevron, the Court did precisely 
what Watts advocates under the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review. And, at first blush, this seems like the quintessential case that 
justifies the invocation of the political values of the administration. 
Abortion is a contentious political issue that has played a significant role 
in presidential campaigns.
172
 President Reagan announced the decision and 
made his support of it clear, implying that the White House was essentially 
the driving force behind the rule change.
173
 Reagan‘s announcement came 
at a time when Vice President George H.W. Bush was facing a challenge 
from the Right for the Republican nomination in the next presidential 
election.
174
 Presumably, those in favor of restricting access to abortions 
would see the Secretary‘s interpretation as a reason to vote for Bush in the 
next election, and those opposed would use it as a reason to vote against 
him.  
But, for many people the issue is not simply being for or against 
abortion. Whether the abortion is necessary to protect the life and health of 
the pregnant woman affect many people‘s idea of whether abortion is 
justified in particular instances.
175
 By invoking the president‘s political 
preference, however, HHS was able to avoid having to indicate the effect 
of its changed interpretation on pregnant women whose health might be 
 
 
 170. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 187. 
 171. Id. (quoting Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 165, at 2944). 
 172. News articles reporting on abortion as a campaign issue are legion. See, e.g., Marc Santora, 
Giuliani Tries to Reassure Religious Conservatives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A23; Richard L. 
Berke, Christian Right Issues a Threat to the G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1995, at 1. The history of 
the Abortion Counseling Regulations themselves illustrates how the abortion issue can relate to 
candidates‘ presidential campaigns. ―President Reagan announced that [HHS] would publish proposed 
[Abortion Counseling] [R]egulations‖ on July 30, 1987. Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 
165, at 2922. This occurred, perhaps not coincidentally, just as Vice President Bush faced opposition 
from the religious right for the Republican nomination for president. See David E. Rosenbaum, 
Robertson Backers Eager for Southern Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1988, at 1; Phil Gailey, Religious 
Right Challenging G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1986, at B12. 
 173. See Abortion Counseling Regulations, supra note 165, at 2922; Spencer Rich, Reagan to 
Tighten Family-Planning Aid Rules, WASH. POST, July 30, 1987, at A9. 
 174. See Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron, supra note 169, at 101–02. 
 175. Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx#2 (last visited Oct. 12, 
2011). In 2011, when survey respondents were asked directly whether abortion should be legal or 
illegal when the woman‘s life is in danger, 83 percent believed it should be legal and 13 percent 
believed it should be illegal. This is in stark contrast to 47 percent of Americans who identify as pro-
life. Id. 
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endangered by childbirth, many of whom did not have personal physicians 
to inform them of the related risks.
176
 I do not doubt that the Reagan 
administration could have justified its ultimate interpretation of Title X. 
But, it is not certain that the Secretary of HHS would have adopted that 
interpretation or that the interpretation would have had the same political 
impact if the Secretary had to explain that for whatever number of fetuses 
HHS expected the policy to keep from being aborted, it would also likely 
result in the death of a certain number of women.  
A second problem with the accountability defense of Watts‘s proposal 
is its extreme optimism about the capability of the political market to 
register preferences about regulatory outcomes. Watts argues that her 
proposal would bring the arbitrary and capricious review in line with the 
widely accepted model of political control as a justification for the 
administrative state.
177
 The implications of that model for judicial doctrine, 
however, are more complicated than Watts‘s analysis suggests. In 
particular, her argument that hard-look review is inconsistent with the 
political control model assumes that such control will sufficiently 
constrain agency regulation so that it reflects the values of the polity.
178
  
The political control model focuses on Congress and the president as 
providing accountability for agency decisions.
179
 Outside the formal 
mechanisms of legislation and Senate votes on presidential appointments, 
congressional influence operates primarily through the committee 
system.
180
 There are serious problems both with ascribing the influence 
wielded in committees to the legislature as a whole
181
 and with the ability 
 
 
 176. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
 177. Watts, supra note 7, at 39. 
 178. See Criddle, supra note 85, at 461 (describing ―the [f]iction of [p]residential 
[a]ccountability‖); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 
1266–71 (2009); Heidi Kitrosser, The Acccountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1763–69 
(2009) (noting that the President‘s control over information allows him to escape meaningful 
accountability for agency policies); Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and 
Balances: The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 197–202 (1995) 
(critically analyzing the assertion that presidential management of administrative policy is accountable 
to public opinion).  
 179. See Watts, supra note 7, at 35–36 (noting that the political control model legitimates agency 
political decision-making by stressing that agencies are accountable because they are controlled by the 
political branches). 
 180. See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 70 (2006) 
(discussing the role of committees in the informal supervision of agencies). 
 181. Neither the fact that legislative committees are not necessarily representative of the 
legislature as an institution, nor the lack of the accountability of individual members of Congress to 
any national constituency renders the influence of committee members on agencies illegitimate in the 
rough and tumble of interactions among the political branches. See FCC v. Fox Television, 556 U.S. 
502, 525 n.5 (2009) (indicating that ―extrastatutory influence Congress exerts over agencies . . . by the 
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of elections within individual congressional districts to hold committee 
members accountable to the general national interest.
182
 The president, 
however, is more promising as a source of public-interest-focused 
influence. After all, the president answers to the entire electorate, so he has 
an incentive to regulate only when the regulation benefits the nation as a 
whole.
183
 Unfortunately, the system of electing the president does not 
operate so efficiently that one can trust the president to influence agencies 
to act in the public interest on most, let alone all, regulatory issues.
184
  
Problems with presidential control are illuminated by the public choice 
critique of the interest group model, which highlights ways in which 
focused interest groups have an advantage in the political arena over 
diffuse interest groups.
185
 On many issues, the general public will not have 
any knowledge that an agency acted. They will have even less knowledge 
about how the agency acted. And, they will almost certainly not have any 
idea about the impacts or even the significance of the action.
186
 Those 
directly subject to regulation are likely to be aware of all the implications 
of a potential new rule.
187
 Hence, they are more apt to seek White House 
 
 
congressional committees responsible for oversight and appropriations with respect to the relevant 
agency‖ is proper). Permitting courts to distinguish regulations they will affirm from those they will 
reverse based on the expressed views of a subgroup of the legislature, however, would seem to run 
afoul of the constitutional principle that Congress cannot delegate its lawmaking powers to a subgroup 
or agent of the legislative branch. According to John Manning:  
The constitutionally ordained legislative process of bicameralism and presentment is designed 
to check factional influence, promote caution and deliberation, and provoke public discussion. 
To prevent the circumvention of that process, the Court has consistently forbidden Congress 
to reserve delegated authority for its own components, agents, or members. 
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 84 n.52 
(2006) (citation omitted) (citing as examples supporting his statement, Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. 
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 275–77 (1991); Bowsher v. Synar, 
478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–59 (1983)). 
 182. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 71 (2000) (describing the committee system as a means of delivering 
unjustified benefits to special interest groups); Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The 
Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as 
Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132, 157–58 (1988) (describing the committee system as a mechanism to 
facilitate legislators obtaining benefits that may run counter to the preferences of the majority of the 
legislative body). 
 183. See Mashaw, supra note 19, at 95–96. 
 184. See Criddle, supra note 85, at 461–64; Shane, supra note 178, at 204–06. 
 185. See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33–41, 60 (1998). 
 186. See John A. Ferejohn, Information and the Electoral Process, in INFORMATION AND 
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES 3, 3 (John A. Ferejohn & James H. Kuklinski eds., 1990) (―Decades of 
behavioral research have shown that most people know little about . . . the public issues that occupy 
officials from Washington to city hall.‖); Sally Katzen, Governing in the Information Age: Technology 
as a Tool of Democratic Engagement, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2285, 2288 (2011). 
 187. In fact, the agency usually will seek out information from regulated industries well before 
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support for their preferred regulatory outcomes than would the general 
public or a group with diffuse interests. In some instances, interest group 
entrepreneurs might manage to overcome organizational barriers faced by 
diffuse interest groups.
188
 But even if such entrepreneurs manage to form a 
public interest group that participates in the rulemaking, they will have a 
difficult time mobilizing its members to respond to agency action at the 
polls.
189
  
In short, focused interest groups are more likely to have the incentives 
and ability to monitor agencies and appeal to the White House to support 
their regulatory preferences. As public choice literature recognizes, the 
differences in the incentives and costs faced by different interest groups 
greatly increase the likelihood that regulation will serve special interests at 
the expense of the general public.
190
 And ―neither the contemporary 
process of presidential selection nor the observed behavior of voters, 
candidates, or Presidents corroborates the story of a ‗Representative-in-
Chief,‘ whose immunity from regionalism and special interest politics 
enables him, uniquely, to identify and further some higher will of the 
whole nation.‖191 Therefore, if we seek to improve administrative 
accountability, it seems worthwhile to maintain nonpolitical checks that at 
least encourage agencies to reveal the value choices they make when they 
regulate. Watts‘s proposal, unfortunately, would compromise one of the 
 
 
developing a proposed rule. See Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the 
Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 127 (2011) 
(reporting empirical evidence that regulated entities are more aware and involved in rule development 
than are public interest groups); Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in 
the Administrative Process 38–39 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on 
file with author) (quoting an EPA official who emphasized the agency interest in getting industry 
involved in rulemaking at the earliest stage).  
 188. See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 16–37 (1982) (describing the barriers to 
collective action and the significance of ―political entrepreneurs‖ in group coordination); JACK L. 
WALKER JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 41–55 (1991) (describing the role of policy entrepreneurs in mobilizing a large number 
of people on questions of policy); Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1, 11–15 (1969) (explaining how ―entrepreneurs/organizers‖ invest the initial 
capital needed to overcome barriers to collective action). 
 189. See Erin A. O‘Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1157 (2000) (―The winning interest groups are typically those who can organize 
most cheaply and effectively to raise and spend money, or to mobilize votes and other political 
resources.‖). 
 190. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 
3 (1971) (proposing a public choice model arguing that ―regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated primarily for its benefit‖). See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (describing organizational 
advantages of small focused interest groups over large diffuse ones). 
 191. Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information 
Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 360 (2010). 
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most important of such checks—meaningful judicial inquiry into 
explanations for agency action.  
Hard-look review helps ferret out rules that reflect political payoffs 
rather than electoral support. It does so by demanding that the agency 
make clear the implications of any agency action.
192
 Not infrequently, 
agencies are unwilling to do so, perhaps because that will make obvious 
the costs of the action to the general public and thereby cause political 
backlash. Instead, they try to couch decisions motivated by political 
giveaways as benefitting the general public.
193
 In some cases, however, 
they are unable to do so, and the courts, under the hard-look test, find the 
agency decision simply illogical or so full of holes in data or reasoning 
that they reverse the decision.
194
  
At first blush, one might think this is the perfect situation for Professor 
Watts‘s proposal to provide benefits of transparency. Implicit in her 
account is the assumption that if the agency is allowed to justify its 
rulemaking decision on political grounds, then it will have to reveal that its 
politics is motivated by its desire to provide rents to the special interest 
group. But that is not how politics works.
195
 Far more likely, the 
administration would couch its decision as being based on opposition to 
intrusive and needless government regulation, or some similar political 
platitude. Unless courts are willing to look behind the spin put on a 
political statement supporting an agency action, allowing the agency to 
 
 
 192. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 193. By some accounts, the new source performance standards set by the EPA for coal fired 
power plants in 1978 were a giveaway to eastern coal producers to placate Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Byrd. See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and Clean 
Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1552–53 (1980); see also Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the 
Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 352–53 (2003) (describing 
the FCC giveaway of spectrum to television broadcasters for the development of high definition 
television as an illustration of public choice theory in operation). 
 194. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass‘n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 494 
F.3d 188, 197–98, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration‘s 
hours-of-service regulations for long-haul truckers to be arbitrary and capricious because of numerous 
questionable steps in its analysis and computer modeling of the effects of driver fatigue on the 
likelihood of truck crashes); see also Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 544–47, 549–50 
(E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the agency‘s factual record clearly indicated that emergency 
contraceptive Plan B was safe and effective for women over 16 years of age and that politics had 
influenced the agency to rely on improper factors in declining to approve an over-the-counter version 
of that contraceptive for women 17 and older).  
 195. See Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2583, 2662–63 (2008) (describing how politicians use ―techniques of advertising and promotion‖ and 
arguing that they are corrosive to democracy); Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Policy, Politics and Perspective: 
The Scientific Community Must Distinguish Analysis from Advocacy, 416 NATURE 367, 367 (2002) 
(bemoaning the fact that ―[s]cience is becoming yet another playing field for power politics, complete 
with the trappings of media spin and a win-at-all-costs attitude‖). 
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justify the action by invoking the statement will likely allow the 
administration to escape meaningful political accountability.
196
 The one 
thing that courts are not willing to police, and appropriately so, is the truth 
and completeness of political statements. It may be precisely to avoid the 
lack of judicial suitability to determine the legitimacy of political 
rationales that courts use the hard-look test.  
B. Scientific Veracity 
Professor Watts claims, as a second benefit, that allowing agencies to 
rely on politics will relieve them of pressure to justify decisions based on 
science, and thereby will encourage them to be more forthright about 
scientific issues.
197
 She notes that agencies have been criticized for 
distorting science.
198
 Although she claims not to rely on the truth of these 
criticisms, she nonetheless finds that allowing agencies to rely on political 
influence to justify decisions to courts would relieve pressure on them to 
mischaracterize science.
199
 Implicit in her argument therefore is a belief 
that agencies do massage science to make their rules seem more attractive 
to reviewing courts.
200
  
To understand how Watts‘s focus on scientific truth is misplaced, it is 
imperative to understand the ―science charade‖ in which agencies 
engage.
201
 Rarely do agencies simply assert a false scientific fact.
202
 
Rather, their scientific inaccuracy involves characterizing decisions that 
seem scientific in nature but actually depend on value judgments as 
scientifically justified.
203
 For example, the Occupational Safety and Health 
 
 
 196. See GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO TÉSON, RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC 
DELIBERATION: A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE 16 (2006) (―[t]he public frequently errs about 
whether the policies they prefer will bring about the outcomes they prefer.‖).  
 197. Watts, supra note 7, at 40–41.  
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 40 (―Under the current technocratic model‘s focus on facts and evidence, agencies have 
an incentive to dress up their decisions in technocratic terms and to hide political influences. Agencies, 
accordingly, may well be tempted to align facts and science with political choices rather than giving 
science its own rightful place that is separate from political or value-laden considerations.‖). 
 201. Professor Wendy Wagner coined the term ―science charade‖ in her seminal article. Wendy E. 
Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).  
 202. See id. at 1620–22. 
 203. Id. These value judgments in the scientific process have been described as trans-science. See 
Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972). Trans-science exists when 
one of two conditions is met: ―1) scientists would ultimately agree that selection of the most 
appropriate hypothesis among a range of possible alternatives is based not on data or scientific 
experimentation, but instead on nonscientific factors; or 2) the magnitude of the difference between 
warring ‗camps‘ of scientific judgment is substantial.‖ Wagner, supra note 201, at 1620 n.22; see also 
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Administration (OSHA) might set a ―safe‖ exposure limit for a carcinogen 
using a particular model of how such substances cause cancer. But, that 
model may be one of several that scientists are still debating,
204
 and its 
choice need not reflect any scientific superiority. Rather, the choice might 
reflect how aggressively the agency wants to protect against the possibility 
that workers will develop cancer. Alternatively, the choice might reflect 
the social costs of implementing the standard to which the model leads.
205
 
These criteria are not matters of science. They are matters of policy that 
reflect an agency‘s underlying evaluation of various trade-offs of 
regulation. Science, however, is not irrelevant to the agency‘s policies. 
Science is fundamental in identifying the choices that a decision entails, 
whether those are choices about how science is carried out, or the ultimate 
choice between the benefits and costs of the decision. 
Armed with this understanding of agency use and misuse of science, I 
see two problems with Watts‘s claim. First, and most significantly, she 
treats agency scientific inquiry as an end in itself that is separable from 
policy.
206
 But agency science is really an intermediate step in the process 
of enabling the agency to evaluate its regulatory decisions. The goal of 
judicial review with respect to an agency‘s scientific determinations is to 
encourage the agency to evaluate relevant science carefully and accurately 
identify the value choices effectuated by its actions. In addition, judicial 
review forces the agency to reveal the judgments on which its actions 
depend. Watts‘s proposal essentially extends an agency‘s ability to hide its 
value judgments to another dimension; the proposal might decrease 
agency lying, but it would do so by obviating the need for agencies to 
focus on science at all. Thus, it would sacrifice the ultimate goal of 
transparency of agency decision-making. Second, even focusing solely on 
scientific veracity, in many instances her proposal is likely to exacerbate 
agencies‘ mischaracterization of science.  
 
 
Meazell, supra note 39, at 743 (―Although traditional science is infused with policy decisions, agency 
science is even more so because it is conducted for different purposes. That is, agency science is 
marshaled to fulfill legal standards in statutes consistent with executive-branch policy.‖). 
 204. For a discussion of these possible dose-response functions, see generally Carol L. Silva & 
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, The Precautionary Principle in Context: U.S. and E.U. Scientists’ 
Prescriptions for Policy in the Face of Uncertainty, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 640 (2007).  
 205. See Meazell, supra note 39, at 744–45 (noting that ―OSHA must consider the requirements of 
its statutory mandate, the current administration's policy goals, the costs and benefits of regulation, and 
the like, in addition to the limited scientific information, in coming up with a single number that 
regulates workplace exposure‖). 
 206. This is evident from Watts‘s focus on concerns that ―[a]gencies . . . [might] be tempted to 
align facts and science with political choices rather than giving science its own rightful place . . . .‖ 
Watts, supra note 7, at 40.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss1/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] THE IRRELEVANCE OF POLITICS 181 
 
 
 
 
One motivation for an agency to inaccurately characterize a decision as 
science-driven is to allow the agency to create the impression of 
objectivity when explaining why its rulemaking decisions are consistent 
with scientific criteria imposed by its enabling act.
207
 In essence, an 
agency might mischaracterize whether an outcome in a rulemaking issue is 
scientifically determined because it fears that if it told the truth, it would 
be statutorily precluded from regulating as it wishes. In most cases, 
however, statutory standards do not limit relevant considerations to 
science alone, and agencies could explain why they made a particular 
scientific call in light of other factors they are permitted to consider.
208
 
Where, however, the statute really does require a definitive scientific 
determination, tolerating dishonesty allows the agency to transcend the 
rule of law.  
Watts recognizes this and is careful to limit her proposal to those 
situations where the enabling act allows the agency to rely on politics,
209
 
which for her is when the enabling act does not preclude use of political 
factors.
210
 Hence, her proposal would not technically apply when an 
agency must demonstrate the existence of scientific prerequisites. But, 
because her proposal is limited in this way, it cannot reduce the propensity 
of the agency to misuse science when statutory prerequisites exclude 
policy considerations.  
 
 
 207. Statutes that provide at least some scientific criteria that an agency must consider when 
regulating are legion. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2012) (National ambient air 
quality standards must ―attain[] and maintain[] . . . an adequate margin of safety . . . requisite to protect 
the public health.‖); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2012) (listing of endangered 
species is to be based ―solely on . . . the best scientific and commercial data available‖); Occupational 
Safety and Health Act 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2012) (Toxics in the workplace are to be set at a level 
―which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that 
no employee will suffer material impairment of health . . . .‖). 
 208. See Wagner, supra note 201, at 1667–68 & n.201 (claiming that only the Clean Air Act and 
the Delaney Clause of the Food and Drug Act preclude regulators from considering costs and 
feasibility). Arguably, the listing of endangered species also cannot be based on economics or 
feasibility of protection, although the statute provides for the ―God Squad‖ to make exceptions 
allowing extinction of a species when the negative ramifications of maintaining the species are 
extreme. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (e)(1)-(2), (h) (authorizing the Endangered Species Committee, 
comprised of seven specified federal officials, to grant agencies exemptions from the Endangered 
Species Act in limited circumstances). 
 209. Watts, supra note 7, at 46 (noting that it would be inappropriate for an agency to rely on 
politics when Congress has explicitly limited determinations to those based on science); see also id. at 
52 (expressing that her proposal not apply if ―a statute explicitly or implicitly forecloses political 
considerations from an agency‘s calculus altogether (as the ESA‘s ‗best science‘ standard appears to 
do with respect to the listing of endangered species)‖). 
 210. Watts, supra note 7, at 52; see also Pierce, What Factors Can an Agency Consider, supra 
note 29, at 71 (stating ―[a]n [a]gency [c]annot [c]onsider a [f]actor Congress [p]rohibited it [f]rom 
[c]onsidering‖).  
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That still leaves the question: what role does science play when Watts‘s 
proposal does apply—that is, when agencies do not face statutes with 
scientific limitations? This is an important set of circumstances, because 
agencies may believe that decisions couched as science enjoy super-
deference
211
 and that characterizing decisions as scientific will greatly 
increase their probability of surviving arbitrary and capricious review. 
Agencies, however, do not engage in scientific inquiry for the sake of 
producing science. They are not centers of pure research. For agencies, 
science is instrumental to their regulatory decisions.
212
 That agencies 
mischaracterize the state of science to avoid revealing policy reinforces 
that agency truth-telling is not the ultimate end of agency decision-
making. Rather, truth-telling is a means to ensure agency accountability 
for rulemaking by facilitating communication to the public of the rule‘s 
likely impact. Although Watts‘s proposal might reduce the incentive for 
agencies to lie about science, it will do so without forcing the agency to 
reveal the justification for its regulation.  
An illuminating analogy would be a law that requires sellers of 
residential property to reveal whether they have knowledge of material 
defects—such as termite infestations or hidden damage to the property 
they are selling.
213
 Not infrequently, sellers lie about such knowledge.
214
 
Watts‘s proposal would be analogous to a legal doctrine that rescinded a 
seller‘s obligation to disclose such information. That would certainly 
decrease the seller‘s need to lie and almost certainly would decrease the 
extent of such lying. But, it would not serve the ultimate goal of informing 
 
 
 211. Super deference is best characterized by the Supreme Court‘s statement in Baltimore Gas & 
Elec. v. Natural Res. Def. Council that when a court reviews an agency‘s scientific determinations 
―within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science . . . . a reviewing court must generally be 
at its most deferential.‖ 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). This gives agencies an incentive ―to cloak their 
policy choices in the seemingly unassailable mantle of science‖ in order to survive judicial review. 
Meazell, supra note 39, at 736. 
 212. See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICYMAKERS 77 
(1990) (stating that the purpose of agency science is to ―produce ‗techniques, processes and artifacts‘ 
that further the task of policy development‖); Meazell, supra note 39, at 743 (asserting that ―science in 
agencies is far removed from the stereotypical academic research setting . . . . because it is conducted 
for different purposes‖).  
 213. Many states have codified the duty to disclose. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (West 
2011) (requiring property sellers to fill out a disclosure checklist); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 709.03 (West 
2011). Additionally, many state courts have imposed such an obligation as a matter of contract law. 
See, e.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (―where the seller of a home knows of 
facts materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable and are not known 
to the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer‖).  
 214. See, e.g., Harding v. Willie, 458 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) (buyer rescinded a 
contract when he found that the roof leaked after the seller said there was ―absolutely no problem‖ 
with the roof).  
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buyers about the seller‘s knowledge. In contrast, the hard-look test is 
analogous to a legal doctrine that requires a court to inquire whether the 
seller lied and imposes liability if the court determines that he did. Thus, if 
courts inadvertently encouraged agencies to mischaracterize decisions as 
objectively scientific by affording scientific determinations super-
deference, the ideal judicial response would be to abandon such deference 
for a doctrine that ferrets out the value judgments behind the agency 
decision, rather than allow the agency to invoke politics to avoid 
discussing the value judgments that attach to the scientific predicates for 
its action.  
Even if we accept that reducing agency misrepresentation of science is 
a laudable goal in its own right, there are reasons why Watts‘s proposal 
might actually promote such disingenuity. A fairly common explanation 
for an agency being less than truthful about scientific and technical matters 
is to avoid adverse political ramifications.
215
 That is, an agency may 
mischaracterize science even when telling the truth would not preclude it 
from regulating under its enabling act. Why might an agency do so when it 
could pass judicial muster by being forthright? The question is especially 
puzzling given that, under current judicial standards, the agency can be 
reversed for lying even if its rule would have been upheld had it been 
truthful.
216
 The answer reflects that an agency will want to hide the truth in 
some instances because the truth would undermine support for a 
―political‖ decision that is based on an unpopular ideological position or a 
desire to deliver rents to political supporters. Allowing an agency to justify 
an action merely by invoking public presidential support may create an 
incentive for the president to mischaracterize the action as scientifically 
based to make it appear more objectively justified than it is.
217
 In short, by 
 
 
 215. See JASANOFF, supra note 212, at 242 (noting that agency delegation of fundamentally 
political problems to technical advisory committees ―remains one of the most politically acceptable 
options‖ open to regulators); Wagner, supra note 201, at 1652–53 (suggesting that concealing political 
compromises ―under [a] veneer of scientific truth‖ is often seen as the only means of pacifying a 
public that demands mutually exclusive regulatory goals).  
 216. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng‘rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030–32, 1034 (2d Cir. 
1983) (finding that the Corps violated NEPA and acted arbitrarily and capriciously by accepting 
conclusions that the Hudson River inter-pier area in Manhattan was a biological wasteland).  
 217. As two well-regarded scholars of public policy have noted, ―[s]cience has considerable 
rhetorical appeal when it comes to defending regulatory decisions, as it is often described and 
perceived as being ‗objective.‘‖ Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of 
Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1264 (2004); cf. Dan M. Kahan, The 
Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems 
for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35 (2011) (opining that ―[t]he contribution empirical 
arguments are thought to make to muting contested values is part of their appeal in political discourse 
generally‖). 
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relaxing hard-look review when an agency relies on political influence, 
Watts provides more room for the administration to mischaracterize 
science outside of the agency justification for its action.  
The recent case of Massachusetts v. EPA
218
 may provide an interesting 
example of this phenomenon. In that case, the agency attempted to 
characterize its decision not to regulate as based on the need for a 
comprehensive regulatory approach and international politics rather than 
science, which is the flip side of the usual case of the science charade.
219
 
The EPA may have wanted to downplay science because the Bush 
Administration had publicly relied on uncertainty about the anthropogenic 
connection to climate change in its attempts to win popular support for its 
position of not taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
220
 Given 
that public stance, it would have been difficult for the administration to 
admit that global warming was real and that it might threaten a magnitude 
of environmental harm that exceeds most other such harms posed by 
human activity.
221
 It was easier and less embarrassing to convince the 
public that the science of global warming is uncertain than to convince 
them that the government cannot cure the problem that exists.
222
 
 
 
 218. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 219. Id. at 497, 513. After exhausting statutory reasons for not regulating greenhouse gases, the 
EPA first ―gave controlling importance to the NRC Report‘s statement that a causal link between 
[human activities and global warming] ‗cannot be unequivocally established.‘‖ Id. at 513. The EPA 
then characterized ―regulation of motor-vehicle emissions as a ‗piecemeal approach‘ to climate change 
and stated that such regulation would conflict with the President‘s ‗comprehensive approach‘ to the 
problem.‖ Id. (citations omitted). Finally, the EPA reasoned that ―unilateral EPA regulation of motor-
vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper the President‘s ability to persuade key 
developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.‖ Id. at 513–14. 
 220. On several occasions very early in President Bush‘s first term in office, he claimed to take a 
leadership role on global warming, but relied on scientific uncertainty about anthropogenic climate 
change to justify not acting to address the problem. See, e.g., Letter from President George W. Bush to 
Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts (Mar. 13, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html (last checked Aug. 25, 2011) 
(expressing unwillingness to regulate CO2 emissions because of ―the incomplete state of scientific 
knowledge of the causes of, and solutions to, global climate change.‖); see also Press Briefing, 
President George W. Bush at the White House, June 11, 2001 (―We do not know how much our 
climate could, or will change in the future. We do not know how fast change will occur, or even how 
some of our actions could impact it. . . . My administration is committed to a leadership role on the 
issue of climate change‖).  
 221. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES COMMITTEE ON 
AMERICA‘S CLIMATE CHOICES, AMERICA‘S CLIMATE CHOICES 20–23 (2011) (reporting on past and 
possible future effects of climate change). 
 222. The manipulability of science is illustrated by the fact that a significant percentage of the 
American public is even skeptical of such a well-accepted scientific truth as evolution. See generally 
Jason R. Wiles, Overwhelming Scientific Confidence in Evolution and Its Centrality in Scientific 
Education—And the Public Discontent, 9 SCI. EDUC. REV. 18 (2010) (reporting the ―overwhelming 
acceptance of evolution among scientists‖ but that ―a strikingly large proportion of North Americans 
reject evolution‖). Ernst Mayr, Professor of Biology at Harvard, has characterized the evidence for the 
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Thus, Massachusetts v. EPA may represent a case in which the agency 
mischaracterized science not to pass judicial review, but to bolster public 
support for the administration‘s policy. Watts explicitly cites this case as 
an indication that the Court requires agencies to provide technocratic 
reasons for its decisions.
223
 She thus sees Massachusetts v. EPA as 
downplaying the legitimacy of political influence to something that may at 
most influence agencies after they give satisfactory scientific explanations 
for their actions.
224
 Although she admits that Massachusetts v. EPA may 
be sui generis,
225
 she sees it potentially as a strong indication that courts 
reject political influence as an explanation for agency decision-making.
226
 
But one can just as easily read Massachusetts v. EPA as the backfiring of 
the Administration‘s attempt to misuse agency science to shore up 
political support. By the time Massachusetts v. EPA was presented to the 
Supreme Court, the scientific case that climate change was due to human-
triggered emissions of greenhouse gases was well accepted.
227
 The Court‘s 
opinion was sufficiently in tension with prior law such that one might read 
it to signal antipathy by the majority towards the agency‘s 
mischaracterization of science for political purposes.
228
  
 
 
occurrence of evolution as so overwhelming that biologists ―consider it a fact—as well-established as 
the fact that the Earth rotates around the sun and that the Earth is round and not flat.‖ ERNST MAYR, 
THIS IS BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF THE LIVING WORLD 178 (1997). By comparison, between 1985 and 
2005, the percentage of adults in the United States who believed that ―Human Beings . . . developed 
from earlier animals‖ ranged from 40–45% while the number of such adults who believed that 
statement to be false ranged from 39–48%. Jon D. Miller et al., Public Acceptance of Evolution, 313 
SCIENCE 765, 765 (2006). 
 223. Watts, supra note 7, at 21–22. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 50–51 (noting that ―Massachusetts was not a normal, run-of-the mill case‖). 
 226. Id. at 22. In Watts‘s words, ―Massachusetts loudly reiterates the message that State Farm has 
been read to have established more than twenty years earlier: agencies must justify their decisions in 
expert-driven, not political, terms if they wish to convince courts that reasoned decisionmaking has 
occurred.‖ Id. But even Watts acknowledges that the Massachusetts majority seemed to allow agencies 
to consider politics, after providing a satisfactory technocratic reason for its action. See Watts, supra 
note 7, at 49–50. This reading of the case is consistent with my view of hard-look review, which freely 
allows agencies to consider politics and to make value judgments based on political influence, so long 
as the agency provides sufficient reasoning to make those judgments transparent. 
 227. See Burning Bush, THE ECONOMIST, June 14, 2001, at 77. Even President Bush‘s own 
commissioned report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded, ―Greenhouse gases are 
accumulating in Earth‘s atmosphere as a result of human activities . . . . Human-induced warming and 
associated sea level rises are expected to continue throughout the 21st Century.‖ Id. 
 228. Several scholars read Massachusetts v. EPA as signaling a rejection of the understanding that 
an agency can rely on factors extraneous to its enabling act to justify a decision not to regulate a 
problem within the agency‘s authority. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in 
Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727, 740 (2009) (reading Massachusetts v. EPA to support that 
―an agency . . . must consider Congress‘s factors rather than the agency‘s or the administration‘s 
preferred factors‖); Pierce, What Factors Can an Agency Consider, supra note 29, at 79 (expressing 
―fear that the majority opinion in Massachusetts will be interpreted to reject the long line of D.C. 
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Most significantly for this Article, assuming that Watts means to 
suggest that Massachusetts v. EPA would come out differently under her 
proposal,
229
 the case illustrates how that proposal would allow an agency 
to avoid paying the costs of mischaracterizing science for political 
purposes by circumventing the usual hard-look review. To be clear, I do 
not support the detailed reasoning of the majority in that case. I believe 
that the Court was incorrect to read the Clean Air Act to require the 
Administrator either to make the determination whether greenhouse gases 
threaten public health and the environment or explain in scientific terms 
why such a determination could not be made. Like other scholars, I too am 
worried that the case might presage a judicially created restriction on the 
factors an agency can cite in rejecting a petition to engage in 
rulemaking.
230
 But, to the extent that hard-look review applies to that 
decision,
231
 the Court was correct to have required that the EPA be honest 
about the connection of climate change and human conduct. I believe that 
the Court was also correct to demand that the EPA provide some 
indication of the likely trade-offs between regulating and not regulating 
that would justify the Administrator‘s decision not to inquire into the 
health and environmental effects of automobile emissions.  
Perhaps the scenario that provides the strongest case for Watts‘s 
proposal would involve an agency mischaracterizing science out of fear 
that a reviewing court would not understand a true exposition. If the 
science is truly complex or controversial and the agency fears that a court 
will simply not comprehend the science sufficiently to understand the 
basis for a regulation, the agency might be tempted to obscure the 
discretionary judgments underlying its scientific determinations. In short, 
the agency might try to avoid mistaken judicial reversal of its science by 
simply characterizing its decision as being objectively mandated and 
hoping that it does not get caught. Watts‘s proposal would avoid having 
the agency engage in such a charade, and would prevent erroneous 
reversal by courts in such a situation.  
 
 
Circuit opinions . . . interpret[ing] congressional silence to permit an agency to consider a logically 
relevant decisional factor‖).  
 229. Although Watts does not explicitly opine that the case would come out differently under her 
test, she suggests as much by her acknowledgment that the case most naturally (but not necessarily) 
can be read to preclude agency reliance on non-statutory factors such as politics to justify its decision. 
Watts, supra note 7, at 49–51. 
 230. See supra notes 226 and 228 and accompanying text. 
 231. Lower courts usually do not apply hard-look review to agency decisions to refrain from 
rulemaking unless the decision is one made on the merits based on factors that the courts are capable 
of evaluating. See, e.g., Prof‘l Pilots Fed‘n v. FAA, 118 F.3d 758, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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Even in this scenario, however, there are problems with Watts‘s 
proposal. First, without a court engaging in full-fledged hard-look review, 
there is no way to distinguish when an agency mischaracterizes scientific 
determinations to bypass the potential that courts will not understand the 
issue versus when it does so to avoid revealing illegitimate or politically 
unacceptable rationales. Thus, although Watts‘s proposal might make 
sense when an agency simply takes a ―short cut‖ by mischaracterizing its 
seemingly scientific determinations, it would invite agencies to avoid such 
explanations even when the agency knows that the avoidance of revealing 
its value judgments is problematic. 
Moreover, the costs of having a decision reversed because the 
reviewing court did not sufficiently understand the science are unlikely to 
be great. Although courts vet agency technical decisions to ensure that 
agencies carefully consider all relevant issues, courts generally do not 
second-guess agency technical decisions when those decisions address all 
the data and arguments that the reviewing court finds relevant.
232
 The 
problem judicial review of technical determinations poses for the agency is 
that the courts might not even know enough to understand what data and 
inquiries are truly relevant.
233
 Thus, when courts reverse determinations of 
science that can be supported, they generally do so on grounds that aspects 
of the problem were insufficiently addressed. In such a situation, however, 
with the benefit of a judicial opinion explaining what the court thought the 
agency got wrong, the agency can reissue its decision, in the vast majority 
of cases, explaining why it believes it was correct in the first place.
234
 In 
particular, the agency can home in on why the court misunderstood the 
science or otherwise got the issue wrong.
235
 One could expect that when a 
court remands a rule for which the agency has valid scientific support, 
 
 
 232. Such decisions would rely on the clear error of judgment prong alone to justify reversing an 
agency policy. Courts rarely so rule. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
 233. See Stephenson, ―Hard Look‖ Judicial Review, supra note 28, at 754–55; Thomas O. 
McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 525, 547 (1997) (critiquing review of an agency rule on grounds that ―[t]he judges . . . 
lacked the breadth and depth of experience and expertise necessary to support [their] confident 
assertions about how the agency should go about its assigned business‖).  
 234. See generally William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal 
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000) (reviewing the ultimate fate of rules remanded as 
arbitrary and capricious). 
 235. See id. at 424–25 (detailing how, in a majority of remanded rules studied, the agency was 
able to explain itself and persuade the reviewing court to accept essentially the same rule that it had 
earlier reversed); Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1735 (2011) (describing how judicial remands can signal to an agency the 
court‘s ―understanding of the scientific, technical, and policy considerations at issue‖).  
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ultimately the agency will prevail and will get to adopt its rule, albeit a bit 
delayed.  
Finally, whether or not an agency decision is ultimately defensible on 
judicial review, Watts‘s proposal deprives the agency, as well as the 
public, of the information about the trade-offs inherent in agency 
regulation. Even if the agency believes that its mischaracterization of 
science is merely a short cut to get to the outcome that the polity prefers, 
the agency itself might be mistaken. One of the salutary attributes of hard-
look review is that it may be the only time the agency‘s detailed technical 
judgments are questioned in the entire rulemaking process.
236
 The prospect 
of such review encourages the agency staff to take greater care in 
evaluating its own technical assessments, and may allow it to find errors or 
correct parochial outlooks of staff members who may harbor biases that 
stem from their professional background.
237
 Thus, Watts‘s proposal would 
increase the likelihood that the agency will avail itself of the political 
influence justification rather than ensure that the regulation is one that it 
believes is truly justified.  
C. Ameliorating Ossification of Regulation 
Another of Watts‘s normative claims is that her proposal would help 
alleviate the ossification of rulemaking that scholars have claimed plagues 
the regulatory process.
238
 But in the context of any particular rulemaking, 
it is not self-evident whether the regulatory process wastes agency 
resources and imposes unnecessary delay, or is instead worthwhile to 
encourage the agency to evaluate its policy as carefully as is warranted. 
Moreover, agency adoption of regulations provides benefits and 
detriments to those in the agency that do not necessarily correlate with 
those provided to society.
239
 Thus, in those instances where an agency has 
an incentive to adopt regulations that do not provide net benefits to 
society, ossification of the regulatory process would be desirable because 
it would discourage such regulations.  
 
 
 236. William F. Pederson, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 59–60 
(1975). 
 237. Id. at 60. ―The effect of [hard-look review] opinions within the agency reaches beyond those 
who were concerned with the specific regulations reviewed. They serve as a precedent for future rule-
writers and give those who care about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever 
with which to move those who do not.‖ Id.; see also Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, supra note 63, at 
509–12. 
 238. Watts, supra note 7, at 41–42. 
 239. Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 68, at 252. 
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To illustrate, consider a world in which much of what agencies do is 
create rents and deliver them to well-connected interest groups. In such a 
world, much agency action would not further the public interest; hence, 
delay and discouragement of an action would be beneficial. In some 
instances, however, agency regulation does further the public interest. In 
these instances, it would be better to encourage and speedup regulation. 
Therefore, what is needed is a mechanism that differentially burdens 
agency action—heavily burdening rent creation and only lightly burdening 
regulation in the public interest.  
It is just such a notion of differential burden that explains, in part, the 
constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment of 
legislation.
240
 One can make the legislative process much easier and 
quicker by empowering either house to pass a law without the president‘s 
signature. But a bill that significantly harms the public overall is unlikely 
to pass through the full Article I process because the beneficiaries of such 
a bill have to line many more campaign committee coffers and compete 
with other interest groups that may oppose them on a national basis to 
secure the support of both houses and the president.
241
 Therefore, 
according to this view of bicameralism and presentment, the resulting 
decrease in the ossification of the legislative process would not be good 
because it would greatly enable more bad legislation while only mildly 
facilitating good legislation.  
At the administrative level, hard-look review plays somewhat the same 
role that bicameralism and presentment are meant to play at the legislative 
level. The burden it creates is greater for agency regulation that cannot be 
justified after objective presentation of the implications of the regulation, 
compared with alternatives that the agency could pursue. For a regulation 
that cannot be justified, the agency might try to obscure the effects of the 
regulation to avoid paying the political cost if the regulation is revealed as 
serving special interests. One way the agency might obscure those effects 
is to justify the rule based on platitudes announced by the president in 
 
 
 240. Historically, bicameralism and presentment were seen as a means of simply discouraging all 
federal lawmaking, as well as a means of differentially burdening bad lawmaking. John F. Manning, 
Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 72–73 (2001); see also Michael B. 
Rappaport, Amending the Constitution to Establish Fiscal Supermajority Rules, 13 J.L. & POL. 705, 
712 (1997) (stating that bicameralism establishes an effective supermajority which discourages both 
minority control of the legislative process and interference with property rights); William T. Mayton, 
The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative 
Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 956–57 (1986) (explaining how bicameralism 
promotes rational lawmaking). 
 241. See Mayton, supra note 207, at 954, 956–57. 
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support of the rule. Therefore, although Watts‘s proposal undoubtedly will 
increase the ease with which agencies can regulate, it is very likely that the 
increase will facilitate adoption of rules that benefit connected interest 
groups at the expense of the national welfare more than rules that serve a 
broader public interest. 
III. THE IMPROPRIETY OF JUDICIAL EVALUATION OF POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE 
My final concern with factoring political influence into judicial review 
of whether a regulation is arbitrary and capricious stems from the inherent 
impropriety of having courts determine when political influence is 
legitimate. It is imperative to understand that consideration of political 
influence under arbitrary and capricious review is not grounded in any 
assessment of whether adoption of a regulation has violated the 
Constitution or any statutory prescription. Watts would have the courts 
assess whether political influence on which an agency might rely is 
sufficiently grounded in ―public values.‖242 Given that there are no broadly 
accepted criteria for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate political 
influences, however, Watts‘s proposal either would eviscerate meaningful 
arbitrary and capricious review or inappropriately rely on judges to weigh 
the import of such influence.
243
  
 
 
 242. See Watts, supra note 7, at 53–54. Watts also would require that the political desire be 
communicated to the agency in a sufficiently transparent manner. Id. at 8. Although this requirement 
raises a host of questions about possible constitutionally based prerogatives of the White House to 
communicate with government officials in private, those questions involve different sorts of critiques 
from those I address in this article, and hence, I leave them to another day. Cf. Watts, supra note 7 
(clarifying that her article does not address Nina Mendelson‘s call for greater transparency of 
presidential influence on agency rulemaking). 
 243. Watts recognizes that there is a ―normative question of whether judges ought to be searching 
for public values to support governmental decisions.‖ Watts, supra note 7, at 53. But, she leaves that 
question aside because, she claims, judges are comfortable searching out public values in determining 
the constitutionality of statutes. Id. Her support for such judicial comfort, however, is citation to Cass 
R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692 (1984). But the 
determinations that Sunstein discusses occur as part of the Court evaluating whether the government 
has relied on constitutionally prohibited factors. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the 
Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1710–17 (1984) (discussing how the prohibition on 
government reliance on naked politics works under the various standards of the equal protection 
clause). Thus, the search for public values reflected in existing cases may be better viewed as an 
inquiry into whether specific prohibited constitutional criteria were responsible for the political action. 
And the varied standards of review may be seen to reflect the a priori likelihood that the political 
actors did rely on impermissible factors. This involves a very different kind of evaluation of whether 
government action serves public values than Watts‘s proposal would require. See supra note 216 and 
accompanying text. 
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Watts would ground legitimacy in a requirement that political influence 
be based on ―public values‖ rather than ―pure partisan politics.‖244 
Although she never defines these terms, her discussion and examples 
imply that it would be illegitimate for an agency to rely on political 
influence by simply asserting that it adopted a regulation because that is 
what the president demanded or because he desired the regulation to pay 
back his political supporters.
245
 Defining public interest based influence, 
however, as merely something distinct from what those with political 
power want, provides little purchase in distinguishing a regulation that can 
be justified as reflecting legitimate politics from that which cannot. Any 
government action can be framed as serving some purpose other than 
merely satisfying the preferences of those in political power. Today, 
redistributing wealth is generally accepted as a legitimate role for 
government so long as the redistribution can be justified by some notion of 
morality or dessert.
246
 For example, one can justify a tax increase on the 
wealthy together with a program of benefits for the poor as a means of 
improving the lot of the unfortunate in society who are least well-off. One 
can also justify the exact opposite—a tax decrease on the wealthy and a 
cutback on benefits to the poor—on the ground that the wealthy pay more 
than their fair share for what government provides. Given the legitimacy 
of wealth redistribution, there is virtually nothing that cannot be justified, 
at least facially, on grounds other than pure political power.
247
  
In fact, given the general discontent of the populous with naked 
assertions of political power, politicians have great incentive to hide such 
 
 
 244. Watts, supra note 7, at 54. 
 245. Id. at 53–57. There seems to be broad scholarly consensus that such reasons do not 
legitimately justify agency action. See, e.g., Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 17, at 504–
05; Mashaw, supra note 19, at 95; Mendelson, ―Political‖ Oversight, supra note 7, at 1175–76. 
 246. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Introduction to the 2006 Templeton Lecture: Hitting Home—The 
Supreme Court Earns Public Notice Opining on Public Use, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 501, 530 (2006) (―I 
don‘t think any legitimate argument can be made that . . . wealth redistribution is impermissible.‖); 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ―Just 
Compensation‖ Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1967) (―Few people any longer doubt that 
governments are properly engaged in controlling the distribution of wealth and income among 
members of society. . . .‖); Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 907, 917 (1993) (stating that wealth redistribution ―programs are a necessary part of any system 
of property rights‖); cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than 
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (arguing that taxation rather 
than legal rules it the best way to redistribute income). But see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 298–
99, 314–24 (1985) (contending that redistribution of wealth is not a legitimate public purpose of 
government). 
 247. See PINCIONE & TÉSON, supra note 196, at 18, 217 (noting the relationship of government 
power to redistribute wealth and ―discourse failure‖).  
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assertions behind seemingly legitimate reasons.
248
 Hence, political 
influence will virtually always be shrouded in some invocation of other 
values. If all that ―based on public values‖ means is that some rationale 
other than a pure exercise of political power can be asserted for a 
regulation, then Watts‘s proposal would essentially eviscerate the arbitrary 
and capricious standard whenever the president expressed a desire for a 
regulation. The unfortunate result would be that agencies would be freed 
from having to collect and analyze information that would shed light on 
the trade-offs and value judgments underlying the regulation—the precise 
information that is needed to make political accountability meaningful. 
A careful reading of Watts‘s proposal suggests that she would have 
courts make a finer distinction than merely acquiescing in political 
statements framed in terms other than raw political power. Her 
modification of hard-look review identifies politics as one factor courts 
should consider along with technocratic information.
249
 She concedes that 
under her proposal courts would have to weigh political influence and 
balance it against other factors that they consider under hard-look 
review.
250
 But if that were the case, then courts would have to determine 
not only whether political influence of regulation was an assertion of pure 
political power, but also whether it was sufficiently publicly interested to 
overcome any shortcoming in the agency analysis of the rule under the 
current hard-look standard.
251
 Having courts make that determination is 
extremely problematic.
252
 
Most obviously, courts can claim neither political stature nor any 
special skill at divining whether the outcome of the political process, be it 
statute or regulation, comports with the values and preferences of the 
polity. Courts are insulated from political accountability and have no 
inherent claim to assessing the weight of appeals to politics.
253
 Nor are 
 
 
 248. Id. at 18, 217 (stating that ―[d]iscourse failure . . . results from [among other things] the 
incentives of politicians and lobbyists to spread inaccurate views‖ and that ―vote seeking politicians‖ 
have an incentive to engage in ―posturing‖); Watts, supra note 7, at 82–84. 
 249. Watts, supra note 7, at 84. 
 250. Id. at 82–83.  
 251. Cf. id. at 53 (explicitly declining to evaluate the propriety of judges ―searching for public 
values to support government decisions.‖).  
 252. See Mendelson, ―Political‖ Oversight, supra note 7, at 1131 (expressing concern that 
proposals having courts consider political influence on agency decision-making ―place an 
inappropriate burden on the judiciary to distinguish good and bad political reasons‖). 
 253. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 269–70 (1988) (arguing that ―it is analytically 
inconsistent and contrary to the assignment of political responsibility within our constitutional 
structure for the judiciary to tolerate liberal delegations of authority to executive agencies and, then, 
selectively undermine or displace that authority when it is exercised‖); John F. Manning, 
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courts trained in evaluating the breadth and depth of popular support for 
particular value judgments on which appeals to politics ultimately rest. 
Hence, in pragmatic instrumental terms, the judiciary seems a poor choice 
for evaluating the weight of political considerations.
254
  
In addition, even if one believes that courts are the appropriate 
institution to weigh the extent to which an explanation for a rule reflects 
the public interest rather than raw politics, there is a pragmatic problem 
with having courts determine the legitimacy of political motivation. 
Virtually every agency action could be motivated by multiple 
considerations.
255
 Hence, under Watts‘s proposal, courts would have to 
decide the extent to which an action can be attributable to a particular 
motive and then evaluate the legitimacy of the various motives to 
determine whether political influence provides a boost or a barrier to 
passing judicial review.  
Perhaps more significantly, at a theoretical level, I believe that Watts‘s 
proposal actually usurps a fundamental role of politics in the regulatory 
process. I understand democratic politics as the mechanism that allows 
government to act in the face of differences in values that cannot be 
resolved by objective rationality. It is politics that determines whether the 
process by which an agency translates those values into a regulation is 
valid. That is not to deny that there are legal constraints on agency 
rulemaking. But, as long as the agency acts in accordance with the 
Constitution and federal statutes, reveals the trade-offs inherent in is 
judgment, and does not simply assert that the rule is valid because it is 
simply preferred by the controlling political powers, it is up to the political 
process—ultimately backed up by the election of legislators and the 
president—to evaluate whether the value judgments underlying the 
regulation were warranted.
256
 
 
 
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 626 (1996) (―[F]ederal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to 
respect legitimate policy choices of those who do.‖); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and 
Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2237 (1997) (opining that allowing judges to evaluate political 
controversies would result in outcomes that mirror each judge‘s policy preferences).  
 254. In fact, Article III‘s limitation of the judicial power to cases and controversies has been seen 
in part as a means of preventing the courts from interfering with policy decisions of the executive 
branch. See Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, supra note 31, at 289.  
 255. See Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act, supra note 68, at 252–53 (noting that numerous factors, 
including personal incentives of agency staff members, agency heads, and institutional influences, can 
motivate an agency to act). Particular thanks to Ron Levin for this insight.  
 256. As one who believes in deliberative democracy, I would encourage regulators to consider the 
interests of all those affected and to try to find universal consensus on how to resolve the differences in 
value judgments. But I am not particularly sanguine about the prospects that all stakeholders can reach 
a consensus in any regulatory dispute. See Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 30, at 1538–39. 
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For example, suppose that the FCC rule at issue in Fox Television, 
prohibiting the broadcast of fleeting expletives, was adopted at the request 
of the president but ultimately after the FCC fully analyzed the likely 
impact of the rule. Should a court hold that rule to be arbitrary and 
capricious if the president had explained his request as motivated by a 
desire to have the law reflect a greater value on decency in broadcast 
programming than the value prior administrations implicitly placed on it? I 
would think not.
257
 
Current hard-look review would not invalidate the rule because of such 
an explanation.
258
 As long as the agency fully evaluated the circumstances 
surrounding the regulation and provided its best prediction of the 
regulation‘s effects compared to alternatives, hard-look review would be 
agnostic about the political influences that may have motivated the 
regulation.
259
 Essentially, hard-look review forces the agency to provide 
information that can allow better monitoring by interest groups and more 
informed judgment by voters about whether they agree with the values that 
underlie the decision. Ultimately, if many voters determine that they do 
not agree, then the administration at least faces the threat that it will pay 
some price at the polls. Although Watts clearly indicates that she thinks 
that such an invocation of values by the president is legitimate, her 
proposal nonetheless suggests that the reviewing court would have to 
evaluate the value of the particular public-regarding explanation and 
would treat the regulation differently depending on its answer to that 
question.
260
 To me, that does not seem to be judicial empowerment of 
political influence, but rather, judicial usurpation of it.  
I do not mean to suggest that there is no distinction between public-
regarding justifications for regulations and raw political ones. In fact I, 
along with others, have expressed a belief that the regulatory process 
should encourage officials to deliberate about the public good and to 
consider whether the regulation reflects a broadly shared consensus of the 
interests of the nation as whole.
261
 Therefore, the political process ideally 
 
 
The best administrative law might be able to do is establish procedures and constraints that encourage 
input and empathetic deliberation, and then allow the system to operate with the expectation that the 
system will reach outcomes that are more sensitive to differences in values than they would be if the 
system were not set up to foster such deliberation.  
 257. As in Fox Television, I assume that whether this regulation violates the First Amendment is 
not under consideration. See 556 U.S. 502, 529 (2009). 
 258. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.  
 259. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. 
 260. Watts, supra note 7, at 82–84. 
 261. See Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative 
Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117 (2011); Seidenfeld, Civic Republican, supra note 30, at 1571–73; 
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should involve deliberation about the meaning of the public interest and 
rational evaluation about whether the regulation will further that interest. 
Ultimately, the agency should provide some explanation of why it believes 
its decision is good and not simply assert that it is the outcome the 
president desires. But to propose this as an ideal is very different from 
discrediting regulations that some judge finds was not sufficiently public-
regarding. Having created a system that permits deliberation and 
evaluation of values, it seems inherently anti-democratic to force the polity 
to adopt some judge‘s notion of what constitutes a legitimate political 
reason in order to justify the regulation. If the polity ultimately prefers 
power politics to deliberation about the public interest, I do not see any 
legal basis for courts to override that preference.  
Because Watts structures her incorporation of politics into hard-look 
review as a ratchet that helps and never hinders administrative agencies 
survive judicial review, my critique of judicial usurpation of political 
influence is less damning than if Watts had allowed such incorporation to 
lead courts to reverse agency regulation. One might argue that the critique 
is entirely misplaced because ultimately Watts‘s proposal makes it more 
likely that political judgments of agencies will prevail. But, as long as 
judicial evaluation of politics can make a difference in the outcome of 
review, Watts‘s proposal inappropriately involves courts in essentially 
non-legal determinations.
262
 For example, consider a regulation prompted 
by a public statement by the president explaining why he believes the 
regulation is good for the nation. Suppose also that the agency‘s record 
and explanation would not pass hard-look review because the agency left 
some question about the impact of the regulation insufficiently explored. 
Under Watts‘s criteria for legitimate political values, a judge that 
considers the policy to further the public interest rather than simply reflect 
special interest influence will vote to uphold the regulation, but one that 
finds the regulation merely delivers benefits to a politically connected 
interest group will vote to reverse it.
263
 Essentially, whether the regulation 
is held arbitrary and capricious will depend on the judge‘s evaluation of 
whether she thinks the policy is justified in terms of her personal view of 
 
 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (1985) (positing 
that hard-look review attempts to ensure that an agency deliberates ―in order to identify and implement 
the public values that should control the controversy‖); Staszewski, Deliberative Democracy, supra 
note 12, at 857–64.  
 262. The distinction between law and politics in American government has been judicially 
recognized at least since Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803). 
 263. See Watts, supra note 7, at 53–54. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
196 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:141 
 
 
 
 
the public interest. This violates the very notion that judges determine and 
apply law. 
Another possible response to my criticism of having courts evaluate 
political influence is that the reasoned decision-making standard is already 
sufficiently amorphous that it allows judges to rely on their personal 
policy preferences in evaluating whether a regulation is arbitrary and 
capricious.
264
 Critics of hard-look review are certainly correct that judges‘ 
disposition toward a rule—more particularly judges‘ predilections about 
whether an agency thought carefully enough about a rule that it issued—
will be influenced by their view of whether the rule is good policy.
265
 It is 
one thing, however, to employ a standard that allows judges to act on their 
policy preferences without inviting them to do so. It is quite another to 
create a standard that requires judges to evaluate the political worth of a 
regulation.
266
 In the former instance, most judges will be constrained from 
deciding based on their views of policy by a counterbalancing desire to be 
seen as good judicial crafts-persons and the related potential of harm to 
their reputations among their brethren and other members of the legal 
community.
267
 Under the latter standard, a judge can maintain a reputation 
for applying the law in an unbiased manner while imposing her policy 
 
 
 264. Cf. William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce Cognitive Bias: 
A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 629 (2002) (questioning the impact of judicial 
accountability on agency decision-making because of doubts whether ―judges engaging in hard-look 
review will or even can keep their views about the substance of regulations entirely separate from their 
views about the process‖).  
 265. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2169 (1998) 
(finding that, in review of administrative agencies, D.C. Circuit panels with a majority of Republican 
appointed judges reached conservative outcomes in fifty-four percent of cases, whereas panels with a 
majority of Democratic appointed judges reached liberal decisions in sixty-eight percent of cases); 
Miles & Sunstein, supra note 89, at 814 (concluding that hard-look review is ―hardened, or softened, 
by the political predilections of federal judges‖); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (listing among a study's conclusions 
that ―ideology significantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit‖).  
 266. Cf. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 28–30 (1993) (analogizing judging to playing a game, and 
positing that judges appreciate playing the game by the rules). 
 267. See Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical 
Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1113 (2001) 
(reporting data consistent with the hypothesis that ―in certain cases, judges constrain their ideological 
views in order to avoid a reputational cost‖); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial 
Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 
1054–58 (1995) (describing the tradeoff of craft and outcome as motivators for judicial behavior); 
Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
941, 995 (1995) (―The principal incentive for judges is to adhere to professional norms—in order to 
maintain respect within the profession, to deflect criticism, and to conform to the judge‘s own 
expectations.‖). 
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preferences because the standard directly calls for judges to weigh the 
policy arguments for the rule being reviewed.  
CONCLUSION 
In this Article I contend that, properly understood, judicial review 
under the reasoned decision-making standard precludes a court from 
considering political influence as a basis for an agency rule, but 
nonetheless allows an agency to consider such influence in rulemaking. I 
do so by identifying two fundamental attributes of such review, as courts 
have traditionally applied it, that have eluded scholarly focus and perhaps 
recognition altogether.  
The first attribute is that agency reasons, which are what courts review, 
are justifications rather than motivations for agency action. From this 
attribute it follows that the irrelevance of politics for judicial review does 
not preclude politics as a legitimate agency consideration in rulemaking. 
The second attribute is that reasoned decision-making requires an 
agency to make manifest the trade-offs generated by its rulemaking. 
Essentially, by forcing the agency to reveal the likely concrete 
implications of the rule, this attribute makes it more difficult for the 
president and Congress to ―spin‖ the positions they stake out with respect 
to agency policy. It follows that, although judicial review is apolitical, it 
plays a role in political accountability by reducing barriers to public 
awareness of the trade-offs from rulemaking. It further follows that 
permitting an agency to credit politics as a justification for a rule would 
interfere with this role of judicial review by relieving the agency of its 
obligation to reveal the full implications of its rulemaking.  
Having set out these attributes of review for reasoned decision-making, 
I have shown why as a matter of positive law they inhere to this standard 
of review as traditionally applied. I have further shown why they are 
desirable. Finally, I have shown how factoring political influence into 
judicial review would threaten the benefits provided by this standard of 
review. Thus the implications of this Article are profound both for the 
reasoned decision-making standard of review in general and for how 
politics fits within it. 
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